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“PLEASE NOTE: YOU HAVE WAIVED
EVERYTHING”: CAN NOTICE REDEEM
ONLINE CONTRACTS?
CHERYL B. PRESTON*
Online consumers are largely unaware of the extent to which their actions
are governed by legal terms in the form of clickwraps or browsewraps. These
contracts are enforced without any evidence of knowing assent to the terms but
only if the consumer has some notice that a contract exists. The standards for
notice are low and consumers routinely click and browse without forming a
single thought relative to the legal obligations that arise with online conduct—
legal obligations that frequently would not arise with procuring the same goods
and services in the real world. Commentators have been scrambling hopelessly
to propose various schemes for bringing home to consumers the fact that they
are entering enforceable contracts.
This Article debunks the idea that notice of the existence of a contract should
be the measure of enforceability. The concept of notice relies on the purely
fictional notion that a reasonable consumer with notice of legal provisions will
stop, read them, understand the terminology, appreciate their legal
significance, and decide to proceed or not. The relish for notice is
irreconcilable with our knowledge that consumers do not, and cannot, read
and comprehend even a fraction of the wrap contracts they encounter.
Moreover, the law punishes those few who read because any hope for
persuading a court to undertake an unconscionability analysis of a contract is
lost to parties who admit to having read the contract. Thus, the law does not
offer consumers a reasonable option for making better decisions about legal
* Edwin M. Thomas Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University. I thank Brandon Stone for excellent research and editing services as well
as Nicholas Muhlestein and Jacqueline Pendleton for research contributions. I am
indebted to the feedback from various conferences and workshops with the AALS
Contract Law Section and the assistance from the faculty workshops at BYU. I thank
Nancy S. Kim, Margaret Jane Radin, and Juliet M. Moringiello for feedback on
various parts of this Article.
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commitments online. Wrap contracts are merely the means for powerful
contract drafters to legislate legal results.
This Article contains a review of cases addressing clickwraps and
browsewraps in the last decade, which amply illustrates that courts are
enforcing them without much, if any, discussion of the length, print, density,
or sophistication of the language or the parties, in part, because no one expects
consumers to read them. This Article then reviews the duty to read rule, and
its meager exceptions, as well as the status of the unconscionability doctrine.
This analysis supports little hope that courts will begin to police wrap contract
excesses. This Article then reviews and evaluates various proposals for
addressing the problem of wrap contracts and concludes that, while most are
some improvement, none hold any significant promise for real change.
Finally, this Article concludes with several examples of the kind of notice that
would be required to give meaning to the theoretical concept that the market
will adjust as actors make informed choices.
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INTRODUCTION
Consumer online adhesion contracts, clickwraps and browsewraps,
sometimes titled Terms of Service or End User License Agreements,
are a feature of modern life.1 There was a time when these wrap
contracts were funny. We believed that extreme terms hidden in
unexpected places were anomalies and sufficiently preposterous to be
fodder for humor. One of the most well-known examples of this was
a Dilbert cartoon from 1997, where Dilbert, who failed to read the fine
print in a software license, finds himself bound to be Bill Gates’s
towel boy.2 In 2003, a SpongeBob Squarepants episode included a strict
“Company Policy” written in ketchup under the bun on the meat of a
Krabby patty.3 Mr. Krabs, on a brief diversion into having a
conscience, stops Spongebob while reading it to the customer,
declares that it is the “old policy,” and tells SpongeBob to fulfill the
customer’s request.4

1. Such contracts are common, particularly to Internet users, and pop up when
installing software or using an Internet e-commerce sales portal. E-commerce sales
are sales of goods and services where a contract is formed over an Internet, extranet,
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) network, electronic mail, or other online system.
Online e-commerce retail in the United States has been steadily increasing since
2004, and e-commerce sales produced more than sixty-nine billion dollars in
transactions in just one quarter of 2013. Ian Thomas et al., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce,
Quarterly Retail E-Commerce Sales 4th Quarter 2013, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU NEWS, Feb. 18,
2014, at 1. According to one 2011 study, more than eighty percent of Internet users
made purchases using the Internet and annual e-commerce sales are expected to
reach 1.4 trillion dollars by 2015. Khalid Saleh, How Big Is E-Commerce Industry, INVESP
BLOG (July 18, 2011, 1:46 PM), http://www.invesp.com/blog/ecommerce/how-bigis-ecommerce-industry.html. Retail e-commerce spending in the United States
surged fifteen percent in 2012 and rose to be “seven times greater than the
corresponding growth rate for total U.S. retail spending.” UNITED PARCEL SERV., UPS
PULSE OF THE ONLINE SHOPPER: A CUSTOMER EXPERIENCE STUDY 3 (2013), available at
http://pressroom.ups.com/pressroom/content/Media/Image/2013_UPS_Online_S
hopping_Customer%20Experience_Study_White_Paper.pdf; see also Saleh, supra
(noting that U.S. e-commerce is growing at a rate of ten percent a year, while global
sales are growing at over nineteen percent a year).
2. Scott Adams, Dilbert Comic Strip for 01/15/1997, DILBERT.COM, http://dilbert.com/
strips/comic/1997-01-15 (last visited Mar. 30, 2015).
3. SpongeBob Squarepants: Born Again Krabs (Nickelodeon Network television
broadcast Oct. 4, 2003) (responding to a customer who dropped her Krabby patty on
the floor, SpongeBob reads: “Krusty Krab policy clearly states that once the burger
has reached the customer, it is his/her responsibility”); see also Born Again Krabs
(Transcript), SPONGEBOB.WIKIA.COM, http://spongebob.wikia.com/wiki/Born_Again_
Krabs_%28transcript%29 (last visited Mar. 30, 2015).
4. SpongeBob Squarepants: Born Again Krabs, supra note 3; see also Born Again Krabs
(Transcript), supra note 3.
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The concept of being caught unaware by overreaching terms
hidden in unexpected places is no longer funny. While courts might
not enforce an obscure clause demanding involuntary servitude to
Bill Gates, they now routinely enforce clauses effectively and
practically hidden, requiring one-sided arbitration, disclaiming all
liability, and otherwise massively reducing or eliminating the legal
rights of an Internet user who happened upon a webpage with a wrap
contract.5 Recently, the press reported on a hotel’s online adhesion
contract where couples wishing to rent rooms for wedding guests
agreed in the fine print to pay five hundred dollars per negative
review written by any of its guests.6 The hotel later said its longposted policy was a joke, but no one was laughing.7 A comment
thread on the Washington Post’s publication covering the outrageous
policy discussed possible arguments to overcome the presumption
that it was enforceable.8
Online, consumers regularly enter into binding contracts with
elaborate, multi-page terms, using unfamiliar, dense, and inaccessible
language, which they naively assume are either sufficiently balanced
and reasonable or will not be enforceable, if they assume anything.
Professor Nancy Kim reports that even law students do not realize
that contractual obligations attach to online activities.9 Online

5. See, e.g., Stout v. J.D. Byrider, 228 F.3d 709, 713, 716 (6th Cir. 2000)
(upholding a provision that bound the borrower to arbitration while allowing the
lender to pursue judicial remedies for late payments); Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841
F. Supp. 2d 829, 838–39 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (noting Internet users may assent to terms
not presented before them); Smallwood v. NCsoft Corp., 730 F. Supp. 2d 1213,
1224–25, 1228 (D. Haw. 2010) (limiting liability to amounts paid to the defendant,
regardless of the theory of liability, but holding that liability based on gross
negligence may not be disclaimed).
6. Events and Weddings, UNION ST. GUESTHOUSE, http://web.archive.org/web/
20140414161828/http://unionstreetguesthouse.com/events_weddings.shtml (last visited
Mar. 30, 2015). The page has been revised since the incident received press
attention to delete the “Reviews” policy. Eugene Volokh, Volokh Conspiracy
Marketing Genius Award Goes to the Union Street Guest House Hotel (Hudson, New
York), WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2014/08/04/volokh-conspiracy-marketing-genius-award-goes-to-theunion-street-guest-house-hudson-new-york.
7. Volokh, supra note 6.
8. See orin ed deniro, Comment to Volokh, supra note 6, (Aug. 5, 2014, 4:25 AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/08/04/ volokhconspiracy-marketing-genius-award-goes-to-the-union-street-guest-house-hudson-new-york.
9. NANCY S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS 1 (2013)
(“[W]hen I ask my law or business school students whether they have entered into
any contracts in the past week, few raise their hands . . . [although] they have
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consumers are largely unaware of the legal consequences of their
actions, have given up trying to resist, or believe that somewhere
there must be a form of justice that will prevent the actual
enforcement of the more egregious clauses in wraps. More importantly,
however, even if we required enough alarms and buzzers that
consumers could not overlook the fact that a contract exists, we cannot
assume that they will read online contracts—or that they should.
Even when the wrap does not purport to become binding without
acceptance, online users believe that by clicking “I accept” they are
effectively agreeing to borrow the software and intellectual property
without damaging it, stealing it, or otherwise acting in bad faith with
respect to the software.10 Thus, they believe they are agreeing to a
license that is designed to protect software development. Such an
expectation is reasonable and is consistent with the user’s intentions
and sense of honor. Courts, however, enforce terms that are far
more expansive and damaging to the user than simple intellectual
property defenses.11 Many users are unaware that courts are
enforcing contract terms—hidden behind hyperlinks or embedded
elsewhere on a webpage—that were previously unenforceable but
now waive important rights and consumer protections.
Faced with what Professor Nancy Kim, Margaret Radin, Amy
Schmitz, and others have painstakingly revealed about the harms of
wrap contracts,12 scholars have squandered the last decade arguing
that the solution is to provide the user with sufficient “notice.”

checked their online banking account, or downloaded software or music, or posted to
their Facebook or Twitter accounts . . . .”).
10. The user understands some equivalent of the following and nothing else: “I
agree that the software and other intellectual property that powers this site is the sole
property of online service provider and I am permitted to use it only for purposes of
this site. I will not copy, damage, interfere with, or otherwise diminish the use and
value of such intellectual property. I understand that the details of the permissible
uses are available here (with hyperlink).”
11. Professor Kim aptly noted that while some provisions in wrap contracts may
be shields to protect businesses’ legitimate interests, many are swords functioning to
destroy the other party’s legal rights and crooks used for “stealthy appropriation (via
a non-negotiated agreement), of benefits ancillary or unrelated to the
consideration.” Nancy S. Kim, Contract’s Adaptation and the Online Bargain, 79 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1327, 1337–42 (2011).
12. See, e.g., KIM, supra note 9; MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE
PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2012); Kim, supra note 11; Amy J.
Schmitz, Legislating in the Light: Considering Empirical Data in Crafting Arbitration
Reforms, 15 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115 (2010) [hereinafter Schmitz, Legislating]; Amy J.
Schmitz, Pizza-Box Contracts: True Tales of Consumer Contracting Culture, 45 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 863 (2010).
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Notice might be a miracle healer if drafters were required to provide
effective notice in a one-swallow, palatable pill. But notice of what?
In a quick-click culture, “I accept” means nothing. No one can seriously
argue that any reasonable person would, or should, follow all of the “I
accept” links encountered when online, even if the link is apparent.
Further, under the current legal regime, online consumers will
typically be better off if they do not read the contract. Thus, notice
can actually be harmful. Perhaps the best option currently available
is for an online consumer to simply “click and cringe.”13 This Article
demonstrates why. It evaluates various proposals for solving abuses
involving wrap contracts, concluding that, while most are some
improvement, none hold much promise for any real change. If
policy makers insist on falling back to a concept of “notice” to avoid
policing contract drafters, notice must reduce the wrap terms down
to a meaningful, understandable bite-size format to alert a reader to
significant risks and enable comparison shopping with a reasonable
exertion of time.
Part I provides context on the extent to which wrap contracts are
currently enforced in the courts. It includes a review of existing case
law on clickwrap and browsewrap contracts. Part II explores many
reasons why, under current law, reading a wrap contract is not a
sensible option, including the counterproductive consequences of
the duty to read rule. Part III reviews and evaluates a variety of
proposals for solving the problems of wrap contracts. Part IV provides
suggestions for preventing wrap abuses and allowing consumers to
meaningfully shop around among competing online dealers.
I.

WRAPS AND THE COURTS

Courts are now enforcing wrap contracts that would have been
considered unconscionable in the early years when courts were
beginning to recognize the utility of adhesive standard form
contracts.14 This Article is not the place for a detailed review of all the
recent wrap contract cases or cases in other contexts where courts have
recently considered enforceability doctrines such as unconscionability.
A general overview of trends with a few examples will suffice.
13. See Nancy S. Kim, Clicking and Cringing, 86 OR. L. REV. 797, 822 (2007).
14. Cheryl B. Preston & Eli McCann, Llewellyn Slept Here: A Short History of Sticky
Contracts and Feudalism, 91 OR. L. REV. 129, 169–70 (2012) (arguing that courts are
too accepting of boilerplate terms and standard forms); see also, e.g., Cicle v. Chase
Bank USA, 583 F.3d 549, 557 (8th Cir. 2009) (reversing the district court’s finding of
unconscionability and enforcing the contract terms despite the unfair credit
practices alleged by the plaintiff).
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A. Venue Selection Clauses, Arbitration Clauses, and Rolling Contracts
Choice-of-venue clauses in adhesion contracts were, for a time,
resisted by courts.15 However, since the Supreme Court opinion in
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute,16 most courts now dismiss
objections, stating that choice-of-venue clauses are routine and will be
enforced unless some dramatic and extraordinary hardship is shown.17
Like the historical treatment of forum selection clauses, some
courts have resisted arbitration clauses.18 However, the Supreme
Court signaled a willingness to enforce arbitration in almost all
circumstances with its holding in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson.19
Rent-A-Center upheld the policy of encouraging arbitration at the
expense of allowing judicial review of objections to contracts
containing such clauses, including when unconscionability is raised.20
A few courts continue to resist enforcing the more onerous incantations
of arbitration clauses, especially those that waive class actions, are one
sided, impose onerous fees on consumers, or are inserted into
existing contracts post-formation without sufficient notice.21 Most
15. See Polzin v. Appleway Equip. Leasing, Inc., 191 P.3d 476, 479, 482 (Mont.
2008) (reversing the district court, which held that “choice of forum clauses are void
as unconstitutional” and against public policy); see also Patrick J. Borchers, Forum
Selection Agreements in the Federal Courts After Carnival Cruise: A Proposal for
Congressional Reform, 67 WASH. L. REV. 55, 56–57 (1992) (explaining American
courts’ refusal to enforce forum selection agreements was “out of step” with most
foreign judicial systems).
16. 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
17. See Major v. McCallister, 302 S.W.3d 227, 229 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (charging
parties attempting to resist such provisions with the “heavy burden” of proving the
clause is unfair or unreasonable); Copelco Capital, Inc. v. Shapiro, 750 A.2d 773, 775
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (noting “forum selection clauses are generally
enforce[able]” unless the chosen forum is “so gravely difficult and inconvenient” that
it will deprive the challenger of her day in court (citations omitted)); see also Keri
Bruce, Note, The Hague Convention on Choice-of-Court Agreements: Is the Public Policy
Exception Helping Click-Away the Security of Non-Negotiated Agreements?, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L
L. 1103, 1123–24 (2007) (discussing the argument that enforcement of such
adhesion contracts promotes economic efficiency).
18. See, e.g., Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159,
169 (5th Cir. 2004) (refusing to enforce arbitration clause that requires customer to
arbitrate but not the provider); Taylor v. Butler, 142 S.W.3d 277, 286 n.4 (Tenn. 2004)
(accepting the majority view that one-sided arbitration clauses are unconscionable).
19. 561 U.S. 63 (2010).
20. Id. at 72–73, 75–76.
21. See, e.g., Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 733 F.3d 916, 922–25 (9th Cir.
2013) (upholding the district court’s denial of an employer’s motion to compel
arbitration because the policy was provided after contract formation and the clause
was one-sided and imposed high fees without the possibility of recovery); Schnabel v.
Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 126 (2d Cir. 2012) (declining to compel arbitration
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attempts to invalidate choice-of-venue or arbitration clauses in wrap
contracts on the basis of unconscionability fail,22 although there is
one notable exception in an unreported California opinion.
In Mazur v. eBay Inc.,23 the District Court for the Northern District
of California ruled that the wrap contract was procedurally and
substantively unconscionable.24 Oppression was present because the
contract was adhesive, and surprise was present because the Terms
and Conditions were presented to the plaintiff in a form that could
only be read a few single-spaced lines at a time. Furthermore, the
contract was in block-text format, creating a “massive block of
impenetrable text,” even when printed out.25
The court defined substantive unconscionability as when the
contract includes “overly harsh or one-sided results.”26 The contract
was substantively unconscionable because, in part, it contained an
arbitration agreement the court characterized as not bilateral and
practically calling for non-neutral decision maker.27 The clause,
although technically bilateral,28 consistently worked to the
disadvantage of the weaker party, undermining its fairness.29 The
court stressed the lack of mutuality.30 It is comforting to know that
there is some point at which a court will reject an arbitration clause in

because consumers were not given notice of arbitration provision until after initial
enrollment and therefore did not assent to the provision).
22. See, e.g., Swift v. Zynga Game Network, Inc., 805 F. Supp. 2d 904, 915 (N.D.
Cal. 2011) (enforcing clickwrap that included arbitration clause after plaintiff failed
to produce evidence of procedural unconscionability); Recursion Software, Inc. v.
Interactive Intelligence, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 756, 783 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (concluding
that “clickwrap licenses . . . are valid and enforceable contracts,” and enforcing an
arbitration clause when the user was required to accept before installing software);
Mortg. Plus, Inc. v. DocMagic, Inc., No. 03-2582, 2004 WL 2331918, at *5, *7 (D.
Kan. Aug. 23, 2004) (holding an inconvenience is insufficient to overcome a valid
arbitration clause even though the clause was introduced after the initial contract
formation but the buyer was required to accept the wrap by a click before installing
the software); Barnett v. Network Solutions, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 200, 204 (Tex. App.
2001) (clarifying that “[i]t is the unfair use of, not the mere existence of, an
unequal bargaining power” that will invalidate a contract, and upholding the
forum-selection agreement).
23. No. C 07-03967, 2008 WL 618988 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2008).
24. Id. at *5, *7. The court defined procedural unconscionability as “oppression
and surprise.” Id. at *4.
25. Id. at *5.
26. Id. at *6.
27. Id. at *6–7.
28. Id. at *1 (quoting contract text).
29. Id. at *6.
30. Id.
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a wrap contract, but by failing to mark the opinion for publication,
the court nullified its potential effect as precedent.
Another interesting development is the collateral damage of Judge
Easterbrook’s facially narrow opinion in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg.31
Although the case involved contractual terms that appeared after the
software was purchased, the contract was printed in the product
manual inside the box and appeared on screen when the software was
installed and every time the user ran the software. Zeidenberg
ignored those terms and engaged in an intentional theft of a
database with full knowledge of the higher charge for his intended
use.32 Moreover, the opinion itself is limited by various requirements,
including the ability to return the product for a refund for some time
after purchase.33 Nonetheless, this case is regularly cited in lower
court opinions that conclude that wrap contracts are now enforceable
without further inquiry.34
This trend illustrates the circularity of judicial review: one court
finds a new kind of contract enforceable, and other courts then
assume enforceability because “everyone is doing it” without
performing a thorough analysis of the earlier opinions and
distinguishing the facts.35 As the Tenth Circuit observed in Hancock v.

31. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
32. See id. at 1449–50 (discussing the higher price that Zeidenberg would have
had to pay for the license to do what he did and noting that Zeidenberg “decided to
ignore the license”); Cheryl B. Preston & Eli W. McCann, Unwrapping Shrinkwraps,
Clickwraps, and Browsewraps: How the Law Went Wrong from Horse Traders to the Law of
the Horse, 26 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 8–12 (2011) (detailing the often overlooked context of
ProCD and challenging some of the assumptions made in the opinion).
33. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452 (analogizing the situation to the definition of
“acceptance of goods” that holds the buyer accepts the goods “when, after an
opportunity to inspect, he fails to make an effective rejection” (citing U.C.C. § 2606(1)(b) (1995))).
34. Preston & McCann, supra note 14, at 137; see, e.g., Hayes v. SpectorSoft Corp.,
No. 1:08-cv-187, 2009 WL 3713284, at *8 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 3, 2009) (“SpectorSoft had
every right to expect that its software should be used in accordance with the licensing
agreement it provides. Such agreements are enforceable when they require a
purchaser to click on messages such as ‘Yes’ or ‘I agree’ in order to install software.”
(citation omitted) (citing ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452)); Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F.
Supp. 2d 229, 241 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (arguing that “[a] contract is not necessarily one
of adhesion simply because it is a form contract” and citing ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451, to
show the “prevalence and importance” of standardized contracts”).
35. The fact that so many of the recent clickwrap and browsewrap contract cases
are not reported reflects the judicial view that these issues are settled. See, e.g., Be In,
Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 12-CV-03373, 2013 WL 5568706, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9,
2013) (stating that browsewraps are enforceable, as long as there is notice to the
user); 5381 Partners LLC v. ShareASale.com, Inc., No. 12-CV-4263, 2013 WL
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American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,36 “[c]lickwrap agreements are
increasingly common and ‘have routinely been upheld.’”37
B. Clickwraps
Clickwrap agreements are the generally enforceable, standard
form contracts that Internet users assent to merely by clicking an
“I agree” option.38
Most cases enforcing clickwraps hold that clicking is an acceptable
way to indicate assent and stop before undertaking any analysis about
the mere click in combination with the nature of the included terms,
as well as the language complexity, density, and length.39 Even if
5328324, at *6–7, *9 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2013) (enforcing a “hybrid”
clickwrap/browsewrap contract); Burcham v. Expedia, Inc., No. 4:07CV1963, 2009
WL 586513, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 6, 2009) (“Burcham used the website, and he did so
using an account that bore his own name. Expedia is not required to prove anything
more to show that Burcham assented to the terms of the website. That Burcham
either didn’t read the agreement or didn’t see it may be unfortunate for him, but it
does not change the outcome. Burcham is bound by the terms of the website’s user
agreement.”); Cairo, Inc. v. Crossmedia Servs., Inc., No. C 04-04825, 2005 WL
756610, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2005) (holding that “repeated and automated use of
[Crossmedia Services’] web pages can form the basis of imputing knowledge to Cairo
of the terms [of the browsewrap agreement]”).
36. 701 F.3d 1248 (10th Cir. 2012).
37. Id. at 1256 (quoting Smallwood v. NCsoft Corp., 730 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1226
(D. Haw. 2010)).
38. Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 459–60 (2006); see also
William J. Condon, Jr., Comment, Electronic Assent to Online Contracts: Do Courts
Consistently Enforce Clickwrap Agreements?, 16 REGENT U. L. REV. 433, 454–57 (2004)
(demonstrating that courts consider wrap contracts valid if the user clicked “I Agree”
or the like).
39. See, e.g., Serrano v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 863 F. Supp. 2d 157, 164 (E.D.N.Y.
2012) (upholding enforceability of clickwrap contracts when the consumer has
sufficient opportunity to read the agreement, is given an unambiguous method of
accepting or declining, and assents); Kwan v. Clearwire Corp., No. C09-1392, 2012
WL 32380, at *9 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 3, 2012) (finding that if the plaintiff clicked, she
was bound to the wrap contract); FreeLife Int’l, Inc. v. Am. Educ. Music Publ’ns Inc.,
No. CV07-2210, 2009 WL 3241795, at *5 (D. Ariz. Oct. 1, 2009) (enforcing a nondisparagement clause in a clickwrap that made the user liable for “millions of dollars
in damages for speaking the truth” and noting that “in many
jurisdictions, online contracts of adhesion are regularly upheld as long as the
applicant expresses assent to the terms of the agreement” (citing Feldman, 513 F.
Supp. 2d at 236)); Guadagno v. E*Trade Bank, 592 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1271 (C.D. Cal.
2008) (enforcing a contract because there is evidence that a user clicked “I Agree”);
Jallali v. Nat’l Bd. of Osteopathic Med. Exam’rs, Inc., 908 N.E.2d 1168, 1173 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2009) (finding that consenting to the “terms and conditions” by clicking a
“dialog box on the screen in order to proceed with the internet transaction” creates
an enforceable contract).
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clicking were the equivalent of a signature, that alone does not
resolve the issue of unconscionability.
Only a few cases discuss other factors besides the click. One is
Doe v. SexSearch.com,40 where the court addressed not only the
legitimacy of clicking as acceptance but also the content of the
terms.41 In addition to finding that clicking indicated terms were
freely bargained for, the court enforced a limitation on liability
against an unconscionability claim where “the terms are highlighted
in bold, capital letters and with hyperlinks to highlight some of the
more important terms.”42 Of course, a user may click without
finding, reading, or understanding the terms. The provision in
question disclaimed all “responsibility for verifying[] the accuracy
of the information provided by other users of the service.”43 The
court did not address the length or density of the entire wrap, just
this single provision.44
To support its conclusion that the limitation on liability was not
unconscionable, the SexSearch court cited two other cases where
courts had evaluated the way the terms were presented. In Hubbert v.
Dell Corp.,45 the court found the terms sufficiently conspicuous where
the link to the clickwrap contract was in a “contrasting blue color,”
the disputed clause was “partially in capital letters,” and the
beginning of the terms were in “bold, capital letters.”46 The Eastern
District of Pennsylvania in Feldman v. Google, Inc.47 enforced a
clickwrap that was in “readable 12-point font,” was “only seven
paragraphs long,” and could be viewed in a “printer-friendly, fullscreen version.”48 Forrest v. Verizon Communications, Inc.49 is another
case where the court enforced a forum-selection clause in a
clickwrap, despite the fact that the thirteen-page printed agreement
only appeared in a small scroll box on a monitor with only portions
visible at a time, and the forum-selection clause was located in the

40. 502 F. Supp. 2d 719 (N.D. Ohio 2007), aff’d on other grounds, 551 F.3d 412
(6th Cir. 2008).
41. Id. at 729.
42. Id. at 735–36.
43. Id. at 737.
44. Nor did the court consider whether the user could have clicked without
finding, reading, or understanding the terms. Id.
45. 835 N.E.2d 113 (Ill. Ct. App. 2005).
46. Id. at 124.
47. 513 F. Supp. 2d 229 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
48. Id. at 237.
49. 805 A.2d 1007 (D.C. 2002).
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final section and presented in lowercase font.50 These standards are
not particularly high and fail to account for the reality that users
cannot afford the time to read wraps and may not understand the
implications of even ordinary language with legal terms.
In short, current standards for denying claims of procedural
unconscionability are sufficiently low that they would rout
unconscionability challenges for almost all wrap contracts. This can
be seen, for example, in a recent case in the Northern District of
West Virginia.51 The case does not involve a wrap contract, but the
standard, by its terms, would cover almost all Internet users. The
court found that procedural unconscionability is foreclosed when a
person is literate, has the opportunity to read, admits an attorney
could have been retained to review the contract, was not rushed into
signing, and had the opportunity to ask questions.52 Under this
standard, almost everyone using the Internet in America would be
disqualified from asserting procedural unconscionability. The only
factor that might be distinguished is the opportunity to ask questions,
but, presumably, a website with a customer service email might
suffice.53 Webpages with wrap contracts typically make asking
questions inconvenient, even when a human being can be reached
directly. Such a person would (and should) be instructed not to give
legal advice or interpret the language of the wrap. As a result,
50. Id. at 1010–11; see also In re RealNetworks, Inc., Privacy Litig., No. 00 C 1366,
2000 WL 631341, at *1, *5–6 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2000) (finding reasonable notice that
clickwrap agreement terms existed where the user had to agree to the terms in order
to install software, and the agreement came in a small pop-up window in the same
font-size as words in the computer’s own display and with the arbitration clause
located at the end of the agreement); Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d
528, 530, 532 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (finding that reasonable notice of the
terms of a clickwrap agreement was provided where the user had to click “I agree”
before proceeding with registration, the agreement was presented in a scrollable
window, and the forum selection clause was presented in lower case letters in the last
paragraph of the agreement).
51. Dan Ryan Builders, Inc. v. Nelson, No. 3:10-CV-76, 2014 WL 496775 (N.D.W.
Va. Feb. 6, 2014).
52. Id. at *12–13. Similarly, in a case involving a real estate purchase, the same
court denied procedural unconscionability where the plaintiffs admitted that they
skimmed the documents, could have retained an attorney, were not rushed into
closing, and had the opportunity to ask questions. Schultz v. Dan Ryan Builders,
Inc., No. 3:12-CV-15, 2013 WL 3365244, at *11–12 (N.D.W. Va. July 3, 2013).
53. See Nelson, 2014 WL 496775, at *2, *12 (highlighting that, not only did
plaintiff have the opportunity to ask questions, but the other party would “seek
clarification” if she was unable to answer the question immediately); Schultz, 2013 WL
3365244, at *11 (noting that the plaintiffs had the opportunity to ask questions and
were not rushed).
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websites can easily circumvent this requirement by giving a customer
an opportunity to ask questions while frustrating the possibility of
obtaining helpful information.
i.Lan Systems, Inc. v. Netscout Service Level Corp.54 provides a more
honest approach, where the court admitted that the clickwrap license
agreement, which added terms limiting liability and disclaiming
warranties in a preexisting agreement, would require at least fifteen
minutes to read, and acknowledged that the users “probably do not
agree in [their] heart of hearts, but [they] click anyway, not about to
let some pesky legalese delay the moment for which [they have] been
waiting.”55 Nonetheless, the court enforced the clickwrap.56
C. Browsewraps
Some courts and scholars have stressed the distinction between
clickwraps, where the user clicks something that might trigger the
recognition that there are legal terms, and browsewraps where no
clicking or other evidence of assent is necessary. Mark Lemley
observed that “an increasing number of courts have enforced
‘browsewrap’ licenses, in which the user does not see the contract at
all but in which the license terms provide that using a Web site
constitutes agreement to a contract whether the user knows it or not.”57
In Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp.,58 the court refused to
enforce a browsewrap where notice of the wrap was merely a link to
the terms, and the link was not visible on the webpage without
scrolling down.59 Such “submerged” links have led other courts to
deny the enforcement of browsewraps.60 If the link or other mention

54. 183 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass. 2002).
55. Id. at 329, 337.
56. Id. at 339 (determining that the clickwrap intended to patch any holes
remaining from prior agreements between the parties).
57. Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 460 (2006); see also
William J. Condon, Jr., Electronic Assent to Online Contracts: Do Courts Consistently
Enforce Clickwrap Agreements?, 16 REGENT U. L. REV. 433, 454–57 (2004)
(demonstrating that courts consider wrap contracts valid if the user clicked “I Agree”
or the like).
58. 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002).
59. Id. at 35.
60. See, e.g., Syndicate 1245 at Lloyd’s v. Walnut Advisory Corp., No. 09-1697,
2011 WL 5825979, at *5 (D.N.J. Nov. 16, 2011) (refusing to enforce a wrap when the
links to the contract were not added to the webpage until after the contract was
formed and the links were submerged); Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F. Supp.
2d 362, 367 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding that a submerged reference to wrap terms
provided insufficient notice), aff’d, 380 F. App’x 22 (2d Cir. 2010); Hoffman v.
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of the wrap is visible on the home page, courts do not require any
evidence of assent more than browsing the page.61 However, one
court found the gray link, although not submerged, virtually invisible
on a gray background.62 More recently, some courts have suggested
that someone who has visited a site more than once is deemed to
have notice of the browsewrap terms.63 Arguably, courts will soon

Supplements Togo Mgmt., LLC, 18 A.3d 210, 219–20 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011)
(finding a submerged disclaimer unenforceable).
61. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 401–03 (2d Cir. 2004)
(holding that the customer gave consent because the user returned to the site daily,
the user was made aware of the terms and agreements, and active assent was not
necessary); Harris v. comScore, Inc., 825 F. Supp. 2d 924, 926–27 (N.D. Ill. 2011)
(denying motion to dismiss where plaintiff alleged that the link to the wrap was
“obscured during the installation process,” although noting that if the link were
shown to be visible after “further factual development,” the browsewrap could be
enforced); Cairo, Inc. v. Crossmedia Servs., Inc., No. C 04-04825, 2005 WL 756610, at
*4–5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2005) (finding the user had knowledge of the terms and
conditions through repeated visits to the web page, which constituted acceptance of
the terms); Canon Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Eufaula Sch. Dist., No. L-2063-11, 2012 WL
1989225, at *1–2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 4, 2012) (per curiam) (enforcing
terms appearing above a space for the customer’s initials); Major v. McCallister, 302
S.W.3d 227, 230 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (finding that user assented to forum selection
clause contained in a browsewrap agreement because the page stated “[b]y
submitting you agree to the Terms of Use” next to a button pushed to continue in
the site and where links to the wrap were visible on every website page). The court in
Traton News, LLC v. Traton Corp., 914 F. Supp. 2d 901 (S.D. Ohio 2012), aff’d in part,
528 F. App’x 525 (6th Cir. 2013), took an intriguing approach to browsewraps and
passive users. The court avoided application of a browsewrap, and held that the
contract should not be enforced for failure of consideration when the user did not
“obtain[] a benefit from using the website.” Id. at 910. This issue was not addressed
on appeal, where the court found the browsewrap did not relate to the dispute, and
thus the case fell outside of the forum selection clause. Traton News, LLC v. Traton
Corp., 528 F. App’x 525, 526 (6th Cir. 2013).
62. See Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 981 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (finding
that reasonable notice of the terms of a browsewrap agreement was not provided
when a hyperlink to the terms appeared in small gray print on a gray background).
63. See Molnar v. 1-800-Flowers.com, Inc., No. CV 08-0542, 2008 WL 4772125, at
*7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2008) (“[C]ourts have held that a party’s use of a website may
be sufficient to give rise to an inference of assent to the Terms of Use contained
therein (so called ‘browsewrap contracts’).”); Ticketmaster L.L.C. v. RMB Techs.,
Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1107 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (holding that it was highly likely to
be shown that the defendant viewed and navigated the website, and received notice
of and assented to the terms and conditions by using the website); Pollstar, 170 F.
Supp. 2d at 981–82 (finding that dismissal of the provider’s breach of contract claim
is inappropriate, even though visitors to plaintiff’s website were presumably “not
aware that the license agreement is linked to the homepage” and “the user is not
immediately confronted with the notice of the license agreement”).
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find that anyone who is not a computer neophyte must know terms
appear somewhere, and so their visit to any site implies consent.
To see the interplay between browsewrap and clickwrap
agreements, the court in Tompkins v. 23andMe, Inc.64 provides an
interesting analysis of how each agreement is either successful or
unsuccessful within the same website.65 The court first considered
the enforceability of the website browsewrap based on the plaintiffs’
use of the site for a product purchase.66 The court found the wrap
unenforceable at that point because “the only way for a customer to
see the [Terms of Service] at that stage was to scroll to the very
bottom of the page and click a link under the heading ‘LEGAL.’”67
However, the court enforced the same agreement through a
clickwrap, which was based on the purchasers’ post-purchase action
in creating online accounts to register their products: “The fact that
the [Terms of Service] were hyperlinked and not presented on the
same screen does not mean that customers lacked adequate notice.”68
The Tompkins court cited Fteja v. Facebook, Inc.,69 where the only
possible place to click was on the “Sign Up” box.70 The click was
effective even though the user had not been presented with the
terms.71 The product’s usefulness was dependent on registering them
for post-purchase service by creating an account. The Tompkins
court states this is sufficient because users creating an account are
directed to new terms even though not prompted to review them.
Thus, the court was not troubled by enforcing the terms of the
browsewrap that it expressly found were insufficient to give users
notice in advance of purchase.72
At this point, the analysis parallels that used in ProCD for
shrinkwrap contracts.73 The contract to purchase morphs into a
64. No. 5:13-CV-05682-LHK, 2014 WL 2903752 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2014).
65. See id. at *5 (explaining that when a customer buys and receives a product,
the customer is implicitly accepting a shrinkwrap agreement, which is inside the box,
when he or she opens and keeps the product).
66. Id. at *6.
67. Id.
68. Id. at *8.
69. 841 F. Supp. 2d 829 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
70. Id. at 834–35.
71. See id. at 837–38 (comparing a typical clickwrap agreement, where the website
forces the user to view the terms and conditions before assenting, to the instant case
where a hyperlink to the terms and conditions was provided, but the user could
assent without actually looking at the terms).
72. Tompkins, 2014 WL 2903752, at *7–8.
73. Compare ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996)
(ruling that shrinkwrap licenses are enforceable because the purchaser can reject the
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contract for continuing use once the terms are made available later.
However, in ProCD and subsequent shrinkwrap cases, the terms
supplied after purchase are only enforceable if the seller offers a
reasonable opportunity for the purchasers to return the product
once they are aware of the terms.74 Moreover, such rolling contracts
are typically only enforced when the purchasers perform an
intentional act of accepting the later terms, such as clicking “I
accept.”75 The Fteja court makes no mention of a refund possibility,

terms and conditions by returning the product), with Tompkins, 2014 WL 2903752, at
*8 (holding that the clickwrap agreement was enforceable because the purchaser
had to take action on the website post-purchase when the purchaser clicked a button
acknowledging assent to the terms and conditions).
74. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 403 (2d Cir. 2004)
(distinguishing enforceable shrinkwrap cases where the customer was notified of the
opportunity to return for a refund); ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452 (explaining
enforceability is tied to the opportunity to return the product if the terms provided
later are unacceptable); Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., No. 3:10-CV-957, 2011 WL
797505, at *5 (D. Conn. Feb. 24, 2011) (citing Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d
1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997)) (noting that the instant case differed from typical
shrinkwrap cases such as Hill v. Gateway because the purchasers never received notice
of the additional terms, nor an opportunity to reject these terms); Kaufman v. Am.
Express Travel Related Servs. Co., No. 07 C 1707, 2008 WL 687224, at *7–8 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 7, 2008) (concluding that terms were “not enforceable because Kaufman was
not presented with any indication that there might be an opportunity to cancel the
contract by returning the card once the Agreement’s terms were made known to
him,” although defendant had a policy of accepting returns and argued that
Kaufman should have intuitively known that); DeFontes v. Dell, Inc., 984 A.2d 1061,
1071–73 (R.I. 2009) (holding that the shrinkwrap agreement failed to adequately
inform the buyers of their right to reject and return the goods and, therefore, the
buyer’s retention of the goods did not indicate assent to the terms of the contract).
75. See, e.g., ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452 (holding that a purchaser assents to a
product’s terms when he or she uses the product after having the opportunity to
read the terms); Hayes v. SpectorSoft Corp., No. 1:08-cv-187, 2009 WL 3713284, at *8
(E.D. Tenn. Nov. 3, 2009) (“SpectorSoft had every right to expect that its software
should be used in accordance with the licensing agreement it provides. Such
agreements are enforceable when they require a purchaser to click on messages such
as ‘Yes’ or ‘I agree’ in order to install software.” (citation omitted)); Specht v.
Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 595 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“Netscape’s
failure to require users of SmartDownload to indicate assent to its license as a
precondition to downloading and using its software is fatal to its argument that a
contract has been formed. Furthermore, unlike the user of Netscape Navigator or
other click-wrap or shrink-wrap licensees, the individual obtaining SmartDownload is
not made aware that he is entering into a contract.”), aff’d, 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir.
2002); cf. Burcham v. Expedia, Inc., No. 4:07CV1963, 2009 WL 586513, at *3 (E.D.
Mo. Mar. 6, 2009) (enforcing a terms-later contract that required clicking to accept,
but noting in dicta that, although such affirmative act to accept is often essential, it
may not be required in all cases (citing Register.com, 356 F.3d at 403)).
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and the post-purchase contract required no affirmative assent.76
Another odd feature about this case is that, in reaching the second
holding, the Fteja court did not review in this context the cases where
browsewraps were not enforced that the court cited in connection
with the first holding.77
These include Hines v. Overstock.com,
Inc.,78 where the court held that the link to the browsewrap terms was
not sufficiently prominently displayed.79
Combination or step-wraps, where the elements of a rolling
contract are combined with a clickwrap and a browsewrap, may be
the point where courts will acknowledge the limits of constructive
notice of particular terms. While the combination of a rolling
contract with a clickwrap is generally enforceable,80 the District of
Colorado found it a question of fact whether sufficient notice was
provided of an arbitration requirement when the clickwrap license
agreement merely referenced a separate Terms of Service and
advised the reader to locate and read the terms online.81 Without
mentioning the time such procedures would entail, the court
nonetheless observed:
[T]o reach the arbitration clause requires the user to leave the
installation program, log onto the Internet (if possible), navigate to
the proper page, and read the Subscriber Agreement, then return
to the installation program’s scroll down window to read the
remaining ten pages of the High-Speed Internet Modem
Installation Legal Agreement before choosing whether to agree to
the terms. In addition, the arbitration issue is confused by the fact
that the readily available agreements . . . provide a forum in the
court system for resolution of conflicts . . . . This creates an
ambiguity regarding recourse in the event of a dispute.82

In the analyses of wrap agreements, little time is spent discussing
the conscionability of the agreement itself. In short, courts in the last
few decades have trended toward enforcing adhesion contracts
76. Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 839 (concluding that being prompted to accept the
hyperlinked phrase “Terms of Use” before using Facebook’s services rendered
reading the terms irrelevant).
77. See id. at 838 (noting that Hines v. Overstock.com explains that a clickwrap
typically is enforceable when the user clicks “I agree” after being presented with the
terms and conditions).
78. 668 F. Supp. 2d 362 (E.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 380 F. App’x 22 (2d Cir. 2010).
79. Id. at 367.
80. See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text (discussing that a purchaser
must take an action, like failing to return the product, to conclude a rolling contract).
81. Grosvenor v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., No. 09-cv-2848, 2010 WL 3906253,
at *8–10 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2010).
82. Id. at *8.
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without much sympathy for, or even inquiry into, the facts that might
give rise to procedural unconscionability.
Most courts have
surrendered to the precedent for enforcing venue requirements,
arbitration clauses, and rolling contracts. Courts uniformly enforce
clickwraps, and most do not even discuss the characteristics of the
particular contract or the particular consumer’s abilities. Those that
do almost always dismiss claims of procedural unconscionability.
Courts enforce browsewraps if the link to the terms is reasonably
visible without requiring scrolling down on the webpage.
Increasingly, courts enforce browsewraps without addressing visibility.
Given the difference in context between paper contracts and
online contracts, the traditional tests of procedural unconscionability
should be taken particularly seriously. Moreover, considering the
sheer quantity of transactions requiring contracts as well as the size
and density of electronic contracts, courts should reconsider the
fundamental concept that any contract is enforceable if a party only
has notice terms exist. Even with notice that terms exist, a
reasonable consumer will not read and respond in market
measurable ways. As a study by Professor Florencia Marotta-Wurgler
makes clear, online users recognize that attempting to read online
contracts is futile.83 Consumers cannot feasibly read and respond to
wrap contracts in meaningful ways.
II. TO READ OR NOT TO READ
Even if Internet users are aware that there are contract terms
somewhere, reading them is downright unwise under current law.
This Part explains why, beginning with the practical reasons,
including the unreadability of most wraps. This Part then discusses
the legal incentives to avoid reading.

83. See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Will Increased Disclosure Help? Evaluating the
Recommendations of the ALI’s “Principles of the Law of Software Contracts,” 78 U. CHI. L.
REV. 165, 168 (2011) (reporting on an extensive study that demonstrated that
requiring affirmative clicks to accept wrap contracts does not result in any significant
increase in the number of consumers who read them). Professor Marotta-Wurgler
explains that “[t]he clearest policy implication is that increased disclosure is no
panacea. Disclosure is but a necessary condition for readership. It appears that the
cost of accessing the contract is not the issue; rather [the issue] is the expected benefit
from reading it.” Id.
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A. Wrap Contracts are Unreadable
A policy that depends on users actually reading all of the wrap
contracts on websites they use would be inefficient. Professor Kim
described the time drain this way:
One study estimated that it would cost the average American
Internet user 201 hours or the equivalent of $3,534 a year to read
the privacy policies of each website that he or she visits. . . . [Y]ou
would not have time to engage in productive work, recreational
activities, or relationships. Modern life, in other words, would
break down if we treated wrap contracts just like other contracts.84

In addition to time drain, a second reason not to read wrap
contracts is that they are difficult, dense texts. Most readers cannot
be expected to comprehend them even if they read every word.
Wrap contracts are increasingly elaborate, monotonous, and written
in ways that suggest the drafter intended to obfuscate the scariest
parts by embedding them in excess verbiage and repetition.85
Remember, wrap contract drafters do not have to worry about printer
or paper costs, mailing or storage costs, or the cautionary impact of
presenting a long paper contract to a consumer in its obvious
fullness. Key sections in wrap contracts are frequently presented in
all capital letters, but that does not help.86 It seems unlikely that the
drafters do not realize that this is the most difficult form of text to
read because the absence of high-and-low letter patterns vastly
decreases comprehension.87 Capital letters might draw attention to a
paragraph (if a user scrolled down far enough) but they obscure the
meaning of the paragraph.
A third reason not to read a wrap contract is that they are
nonnegotiable. Even if the user has the expertise to snatch the legal

84. KIM, supra note 9, at 213 (citation omitted).
85. See infra Part III (detailing examples of changes that should be implemented
to improve wrap jurisprudence).
86. But see supra notes 42, 46, and infra note 87 and accompanying text
(discussing how capital letters may affect the enforceability of online contracts).
87. This effect is well understood by drafters.
All-capital print greatly retards speed of reading in comparison with lowercase type. Also, most readers judge all capitals to be less legible. Faster
reading of the lower-case print is due to the characteristic word forms
furnished by this type. This permits reading by word units, while all capitals
tend to be read letter by letter. Furthermore, since all-capital printing takes
at least one-third more space than lower case, more fixation pauses are
required for reading the same amount of material. The use of all capitals
should be dispensed with in every printing situation.
MILES A. TINKER, LEGIBILITY OF PRINT 65 (1963).
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significance out of the morass of a wrap contract, the user will have
few practical options. An economist would argue that a potential
user can then “shop around,” but this is of little practical benefit.
First, all of the other service providers likely have a very similar wrap
contract.88 Second, if one’s family, friends, and business associates
are on Facebook, for example, using a competitor’s service is not a
reasonable choice. Professor Eric Goldman, an avid defender of
wrap contracts,89 points out that “a site with strong lock-in effects like
Facebook is relatively immune from widespread terminations.”90 A
“lock-in effect” arises when consumers are basically locked into a
particular service or product because the costs of making a change
are prohibitive, either in terms of money or, as with Facebook, in
terms of severing associations to start over on another media site that
does not include one’s family and friends.91
A fourth reason not to read wrap contracts is that the legal
consequences are frequently obscure to anyone without a legal
education. Even with a law degree, the implications of some terms
would be unknown to all but a few contract experts. A brave soul
who tracks carefully through a wrap contract may not have the
background or sophistication needed to evaluate what it means to
assent to clauses stated even with common legal terms, such as
requiring mandatory one-sided arbitration, limiting venue selection,
or waiving a jury, class actions, or all forms of damages. Damage
waivers might be interpreted as waiving only extreme recoveries when
in fact they likely waive every known form of damages. How many law

88. See RADIN, supra note 12, at 40–41 (noting that some products come from
only one supplier, and that differing suppliers may imitate the terms used by others:
“[o]nce one tour company deploys a form purporting to exculpate itself from all
kinds of liability for any injury . . . forms with almost identical wording pop up
everywhere”).
89. See Eric Goldman, How Zappos’ User Agreement Failed in Court and Left Zappos
Legally Naked, TECH. & MARKETING. L. BLOG (Oct. 29, 2012), http://blog.ericgoldman.
org/archives/2012/10/how_zappos_user.htm (referring to Zappos’ “legally
irrelevant” contract that the court would not uphold). For example, Professor
Goldman said “[a]voiding this outcome is surprisingly easy. Use clickthrough
agreements, not browsewraps, and remove any clauses that say you can unilaterally
amend the contract.” Id.
90. Eric Goldman, Comment to Court Rules that Kids Can Be Bound by Facebook’s
Member Agreement, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Apr. 4, 2014), http://blog.
ericgoldman.org/archives/2014/04/court-rules-that-kids-can-be-bound-by-facebooksmember-agreement.html.
91. See, e.g., Animesh Ballabh, Antitrust Law: An Overview, 88 J. PAT & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 877, 884 (2006) (describing the “lock-in” effect in antitrust law, where the
costs of changing will be substantial).
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students realize what it means to incorporate the law of Texas or West
Virginia under which waivers of gross negligence may be
enforceable?92 Using market competition to solve the problem would
require lay consumers to take the time to find and read wrap
contracts, and to understand the language and its legal implications.
That is simply not plausible.
A final reason for not reading wraps is that the text, on its face, may
be misleading and stop users from seeking relief to which they may
be entitled. Wrap contracts frequently include disclaimers that
actually are unenforceable, and that the drafters know are
unenforceable, but are included anyway.93 For instance, drafters
often attempt to disclaim liability for personal injury resulting from a
defect in a tangible, movable item, but, with respect to a consumer,
this is the one thing the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) makes
prima facie unconscionable.94 Consumers who read wraps or call the
company, either before entering the contract or after suffering
injury, may well accept without question the company’s statement
that they have waived all claims to relief. Some wraps claim that upon
default the other party can seize property even if the defaulter has

92. See, e.g., Valero Energy Corp. v. M.W. Kellogg Constr. Co., 866 S.W.2d 252,
257–58 (Tex. App. 1993) (“Parties may agree to exempt one another from future
liability for negligence so long as the agreement does not violate the constitution, a
statute, or public policy.”); Murphy v. N. Am. River Runners, Inc., 412 S.E.2d 504,
508–09 (W. Va. 1991) (“[A] plaintiff who expressly and, under the circumstances,
clearly agrees to accept a risk of harm arising from the defendant’s . . . reckless
conduct may not recover for such harm, unless the agreement is invalid as contrary
to public policy. When such an express agreement is freely and fairly made, between
parties who are in an equal bargaining position, and there is no public interest with
which the agreement interferes, it generally will be upheld.” (citation omitted)); W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 68 (5th ed. 1984)
(finding that a contract to assume risk is valid unless it meets a specific exception); 3
STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 12:48 (2008) (same); 8
SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 19:19
(4th ed. 2014) [hereinafter WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS] (reporting that contracts that
indemnify against tortious conduct are valid so long as they do not violate public
policy). In other states, such as New York, waivers of intentional or grossly negligent
acts are not enforceable. See Gross v. Sweet, 400 N.E.2d 306, 309 (N.Y. 1979) (“To
the extent that agreements purport to grant exemption for liability for willful or
grossly negligent acts they have been viewed as wholly void.”).
93. See, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, The Puzzling Persistence of Unenforceable Contract
Terms, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1127, 1134–37 (2009) (noting that an unenforceable clause
may be included because of the assumption of the other party’s sense of honor and
lack of knowledge about the law, or as a deterrent to violations).
94. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (2011) (“Consequential damages may be limited or
excluded unless . . . for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods . . . .”).
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filed bankruptcy, which the drafter surely knows is barred by
bankruptcy law’s automatic stay.95 Other common terms, such as a
waiver of intentionally caused harm, are unenforceable in most
jurisdictions.96 Wrap contracts typically are not customized to carve
out provisions unenforceable in a particular user’s jurisdiction. Some
wraps may include a provision several pages down that recites that
some terms may be unenforceable in some jurisdictions, but gives no
hint of which terms or which jurisdictions.97 Further, consumers
without access to Westlaw or LexisNexis may have trouble researching
the statutory and case law in their jurisdictions.
These and other in terrorem clauses accomplish their desired effect
if they so discourage the reader that he or she gives up before taking
any action.98 Professor Jason Scott Johnston argues, in defense of
95. Ipso facto clauses, provisions that dissolve or modify a debtor’s interest in
property upon filing for bankruptcy, are generally unenforceable. The U.S.
Bankruptcy Code includes 11 U.S.C. § 365(e), which invalidates ipso facto clauses in
most executory contracts; 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1)(B), which invalidates ipso facto
clauses that would cause forfeitures; and 11 U.S.C. § 363(l), which invalidates ipso
facto clauses that would limit the trustee’s ability to deal with property of the estate.
See, e.g., Emil A. Kleinhaus & Peter B. Zuckerman, The Enforceability of Ipso
Facto Clauses in Financing Agreements: American Airlines and Beyond, 23 NORTON J.
BANKR. L. & PRAC. 193, 195 (2014); Paul Rubin, Not Every Ipso Facto Clause Is
Unenforceable in Bankruptcy, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Aug. 2013, at 12; Bruce H. White &
William L. Medford, Ipso Facto Clauses and Reality: I Don’t Care What the Documents
Provide, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2002, at 28. Notwithstanding a waiver in a contract,
11 U.S.C. §§ 361–62 stops creditors from seizing and liquating their collateral in a
Chapter 11.
96. See, e.g., Flood v. Young Woman’s Christian Ass’n of Brunswick, Ga., Inc., 398
F.3d 1261, 1266 (11th Cir. 2005) (applying Georgia law, which does not allow a party
to exempt itself from gross negligence); Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Sw. Marine, 194 F.3d
1009, 1016 (9th Cir. 1999) (barring parties to a maritime contract from shielding
themselves from gross negligence, which ruling is consistent with the First and Fifth
Circuits); S.F. Residence Club, Inc. v. Baswell-Guthrie, 897 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1210
(N.D. Ala. 2012) (noting that under Alabama law, a clause that releases a party from
“wanton or intentional misconduct is not enforceable”); Hartford Ins. Co. v. Holmes
Prot. Grp., 673 N.Y.S.2d 132, 133 (App. Div. 1998) (explaining that under public
policy, clauses waiving gross negligence are unenforceable).
97. See, e.g., Conditions of Use, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/
customer/display.html/ref=footer_cou?ie=UTF8&nodeId=508088 (last updated Dec.
5, 2012) (“CERTAIN STATE LAWS DO NOT ALLOW LIMITATIONS ON IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OR THE EXCLUSION OR LIMITATION OF CERTAIN DAMAGES.
IF THESE LAWS APPLY TO YOU, SOME OR ALL OF THE ABOVE DISCLAIMERS,
EXCLUSIONS, OR LIMITATIONS MAY NOT APPLY TO YOU, AND YOU MIGHT
HAVE ADDITIONAL RIGHTS.”).
98. Sullivan, supra note 93, at 1128–29.
Contracts frequently contain clauses that are not enforceable—at least, not
enforceable as written. . . .
It is possible . . . that such clauses are
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wrap contracts, that customers will call the business in response to
harsh terms in the wraps.99
The business may then make
individualized determinations of which customers are worth saving.100
If the caller appears to be a “desirable” customer, the administrator
who answers such calls can waive contract terms for individual
cases.101 If used enough in the industry to be relevant, this is a
practice that would waste all of the time saved by the use of nonnegotiable terms as administrators shuffle through individual callers.
More importantly, drafters know that most customers will believe
what is written or what the administrator says is written in the
contract. Only the truly obstreperous, and those with excess time and
ability to articulate, will pursue a complaint far enough for the
chance at an exception. This practice would have an undesirable
result of rewarding that behavior and punishing the less aggressive.
In addition to these overwhelming practical limitations, the law
itself disincentivizes reading elaborate contract terms, as will be
discussed later. The best advice to clients, neighbors, and friends is
to never read them. They will not understand, and the attempt could
come back to bite them.
B. Readability Illustrations
To illustrate the gross inefficiency and futility of expecting
consumers to find, open, read, and comprehend wrap contracts, I
offer some examples of what a user might find behind a hyperlink.
1.

The PDF Annotator example
Grahl Software Design’s “Terms of License for PDF Annotator,”102
its flagship consumer software,103 provides an example of a typically

mistakes . . . . [I]t seems certain that invalid terms continue to be used by
those who are well aware that they are unenforceable as written, presumably
because they have utility for those who impose them. The most obvious
reason is that the other party to the contract (or, conceivably, some third
party) does not realize the clause is unenforceable as written or is unwilling
to risk the resources needed to establish its invalidity.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
99. Jason Scott Johnston, Cooperative Negotiations in the Shadow of Boilerplate, in
BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS 12, 12 (Omri Ben-Shahar
ed., 2007).
100. Id. at 14.
101. Id.
102. Grahl Software Design, Terms of License for PDF Annotator,
http://www.ograhl.com/pdfannotator/std/en/License.txt (last revised July 28,
2014) [hereinafter Grahl Wrap Contract].
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incomprehensible wrap contract, which contains vast redundancies,
inconsistent waivers, and terms that seem entirely irrelevant to the
transaction. These characteristics, common to many wrap contract
agreements, are a function of both the lack of physical space
constraints and the knowledge that consumers rarely read such
agreements. In addition, the extreme language may both deter
efforts to read, and serve an in terrorem effect on a user, ultimately
leading the user to believe there is no recourse after a breach.
Grahl users may follow the link to see a long chunk of text in all
caps. In ninety-five words in the first of three waiver paragraphs,
Grahl states that:
IN NO EVENT WILL [IT] BE LIABLE TO ANY PARTY (a) FOR
ANY INDIRECT, SPECIAL, PUNITIVE, INCIDENTAL OR
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
LIMITED TO, DAMAGES FOR LOSS OF BUSINESS PROFITS,
BUSINESS INTERRUPTION, LOSS OF PROGRAMS OR
INFORMATION, AND THE LIKE), OR ANY OTHER DAMAGES
ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE AVAILABILITY, USE,
RELIANCE ON, OR INABILITY TO USE THE SOFTWARE, THE
GRAHL
SERVICES
AND
INFORMATION,
VARIOUS
DIRECTORIES
AND
LISTINGS
OR
ANY
OTHER
‘INFORMATION’, EVEN IF GRAHL SHALL HAVE BEEN
ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES, AND
REGARDLESS OF THE FORM OF ACTION, WHETHER IN
CONTRACT, TORT, OR OTHERWISE . . . .104

The program does not actually include any directories, listings,
information, or for that matter “information” with quotes (since both
are in the list), but maybe it pays to be inclusive. The paragraph then
tacks on another waiver of liability:
“(b) FOR ANY CLAIM
ATTRIBUTABLE TO ERRORS, OMISSIONS, OR OTHER
INACCURACIES IN, OR DESTRUCTIVE PROPERTIES OF ANY
INFORMATION.”105 One would think this would do the job.
The next paragraph states that “THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED
AS IS WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND.”106 But why stop
there?
“GRAHL FURTHER DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES,
INCLUDING
WITHOUT
LIMITATION
ANY
IMPLIED
103. This program shows 66,843271 downloads and 5-star editor rating on
cnet.com, as of March 30, 2015. CNET.COM, http://download.cnet.com/1770-20_40.html?query=PDF+annotator&platform=Windows&searchtype=downloads (last visited
Mar. 30, 2015).
104. Grahl Wrap Contract, supra note 102, ¶ 2.
105. Id.
106. Id. ¶ 3.
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WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A
PARTICULAR PURPOSE, AND NONINFRINGEMENT.”107 To make
that clear, it adds: “THE ENTIRE RISK ARISING OUT OF THE USE
OR PERFORMANCE OF THE PRODUCT AND DOCUMENTATION
REMAINS WITH RECIPIENT.”108
Next the contract includes
another waiver nearly identical to the prior paragraph, with the main
distinction being that, in this litany, Grahl remembers to add
“DIRECT” to the list of damages, although the phrase “OTHER
DAMAGES” in both ought to suffice.109 This seventy-three word
waiver refers to the product instead of services and information,110 as
above, but those could have been combined.
Most bizarrely, in a third all-caps paragraph, this time eighty-three
words long, Grahl notes that the program is “NOT . . . INTENDED
FOR USE IN HAZARDOUS ENVIRONMENTS REQUIRING “FAILSAFE” PERFORMANCE.111 Grahl then expressly waives liability for
use of the program in the
OPERATION OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES, AIRCRAFT NAVIGATION
OR COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL,
WEAPONS SYSTEMS, DIRECT LIFE-SUPPORT MACHINES, OR
ANY OTHER APPLICATION IN WHICH THE FAILURE OF THE
SOFTWARE COULD LEAD DIRECTLY TO DEATH, PERSONAL
INJURY, OR SEVERE PHYSICAL OR PROPERTY DAMAGE
(COLLECTIVELY, “HIGH RISK ACTIVITIES”).
GRAHL
EXPRESSLY DISCLAIMS ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR HIGH RISK ACTIVITIES.112

This waiver is perplexing considering the software, PDF Annotator,
is tablet-based software that enables the user to highlight, notate, and
digitally stamp PDF documents.113 It is difficult to imagine any use of
PDF Annotator that would make it relevant in any way to a nuclear
facility or a life-support machine. If the program were considered
“goods” under the UCC, of course, a waiver of liability for physical
injury would not be enforceable against a consumer,114 but how many

107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. ¶ 4.
112. Id.
113. PDF ANNOTATOR, http://www.pdfannotator.com/en (last visited Mar. 30, 2015).
114. Under U.C.C. § 2-105 (2001), “goods” includes all things that are movable
and tangible. Although the valuable feature of software is intellectual property, and
thus intangible, some of the first courts confronted with software analogized them to
books, which have as a matter of tradition been treated as goods and which can be
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users would know that? Consistent with treating the program as a
good, the waivers cover a “warranty of fitness,” a UCC term, although,
even if the UCC were found to apply to downloadable software,115 this
warranty would only be relevant if the purchaser engaged with a
representative of the company who knew of the user’s unique
circumstances and made a recommendation of this program from a
range of available programs. However, it costs Grahl nothing to
include all of this, so why take it out? One would think that lawyers
are still being paid by the word.
Finally, if a PDF Annotator user actually has some claim that survives
this onslaught of waivers, the court of jurisdiction for commercial
users is Landshut, Germany.116 Unfortunately, the wrap contract does
not identify German law as the choice of law for consumers.117 Under
European Union law applicable in Germany, most of these provisions
would be unenforceable, at least against a consumer.118
2.

The Amazon example
Another example is the Amazon.com Conditions of Use, which is a
3,437-word, eight page (single-spaced in Times New Roman font 12)

distinguished in that the tangible medium by which they are conveyed is also the
means of using the intangible value. DEBORAH BOUCHOUX, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS, COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS, AND TRADE SECRETS 282 (3d ed.
2009). The comments to the 2003 proposed revision to Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) Article 2, sections 2-103 and 2-105 expressly excluded downloadable software
from the definition of goods. U.C.C. §§ 2-103 & cmt.; 2-105 & cmt. (Proposed Final
Draft 2003) (proposing to remove from the definition of “goods” “information not
associated with goods”). The drafters could not reach sufficient consensus to address
software that was embodied in a tangible disk, although the predominant purpose
test and gravamen test for mixed goods and non-goods contexts would likely both
exclude from the application of the UCC software on a disk. The 2003 revision was
not adopted, so ambiguity still exists about the status of software under the UCC.
The PDF Annotator program is downloadable and has no physical element and thus
should not be subject to the UCC.
115. See also the discussion in Conwell v. Gray Loon Outdoor Marketing Group, 906
N.E.2d 805, 811–12 (Ind. 2009). In addition, UCC Article 2 covers “sales” and, under
section 2-106, a “sale” consists in the passing of title from the seller to the buyer.
U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (2000). This seems clearly to exclude a license to use software.
116. Grahl Wrap Contract, supra note 102, ¶ 10.
117. The Grahl Wrap Contract does not specify the choice of law that governs,
however, it does assert that the software is protected by copyright laws and
intellectual property laws, and the related foreign treaties. Id. ¶¶ 3, 6.
118. See Michael L. Rustad & Maria Vittoria Onufrio, Reconceptualizing Consumer
Terms of Use for a Globalized Knowledge Economy, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1085, 1088 (2012)
(noting that “substantive contract terms in social networking sites and software
licenses clash with mandatory substantive consumer rules in the Eurozone”).
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document. It is a browsewrap that purports to be binding when “you
visit or shop at Amazon.com.”119 Several paragraphs down is the
“DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTIES AND LIMITATION OF
LIABILITY,” comprising 268 words in all caps.120 It includes (twice in
the first paragraph):
“THE AMAZON SERVICES AND ALL
INFORMATION,
CONTENT,
MATERIALS,
PRODUCTS
(INCLUDING SOFTWARE) AND SERVICES INCLUDED ON OR
OTHERWISE MADE AVAILABLE TO YOU THROUGH THE
AMAZON SERVICES”; and, with various redundancies, it also waives
all claims and warranties.121 Does this mean that all products
purchased on Amazon come without a warranty? Yes, at least as to
Amazon itself. It concludes: “YOU EXPRESSLY AGREE THAT
YOUR USE OF THE AMAZON SERVICES IS AT YOUR SOLE
RISK.”122 Apparently, Amazon is, in fact, fairly gracious in accepting
returns of defective products, but it could not be required to if its
Conditions of Use were invoked.
Apparently all of the language in the first paragraph is insufficient,
so the second paragraph begins with an express waiver of all
warranties, including, without limitation, the warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, both with
respect to the same list of items.123 The next sentence reiterates that
Amazon does not warrant that the site, its services, or electronic
communications from it (among other things) will be free from
“VIRUSES OR OTHER HARMFUL COMPONENTS.”124 It then states
that “AMAZON WILL NOT BE LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES OF
ANY KIND ARISING FROM THE USE OF” the site or anything
possibly connected to the site, “INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
TO DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, PUNITIVE, AND
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES.”125 After many years as a contract
professor, I cannot think of any other kind of damages.
Improving on most wrap contracts, the third paragraph in the
section, titled “Disclaimer of Warranties and Limitations of Liability,”
states that some states may not allow the application of some of the

119. Conditions of Use, supra note 97 (emphasis added).
120. Id.
121. Id. The only difference in the two phrases is that the second starts “THE
AMAZON SERVICES, OR THE INFORMATION . . . .” Id. (emphasis added).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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above disclaimers to certain users.126 This at least gives a reader
notice that further investigation may be warranted, rather than the
complete surrender suggested by the lengthy, repetitive disclaimers.
However, few will or can read through so many capitalized words
before losing focus. Next comes a reasonably understandable
statement of the mandatory arbitration requirement.127 Amazon can
afford to be generous and clear in this statement, however, as there
can be nothing left to arbitrate.
C. The Perverse Disincentive of the Duty to Read Rule
Courts are not inclined to police wrap contracts, and, when
tempted to do so in a particular case, the court’s sense of mercy
tends to melt should the party admit to having read any part of it.
In this subpart, I set the context by explaining how the wrap
contract may warrant a reanalysis of the application of contract
doctrines. I then discuss how contract doctrines punish reading and
the duty to read rule.
1.

One stretch too far
A classic World War II movie recounts the failed effort of Allied
troops to capture a bridge at Arnhem, Netherlands.128 After a
brilliant airborne drop and the acquisition of the Nijmegen bridge,
everything falls apart.
Allegedly, British Lieutenant-General
Frederick Browning told Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, the
operation’s architect: “I think we might be going a bridge too far.”129
A controversial and complex contract doctrine that has actually
succeeded in other contexts may stretch on bridge too far when
applied in additional contexts.
In the last century, adhesion contracts requiring little or no overt
evidence of assent became acceptable, subject to judicial discretion to
avoid abuses.130 Preprinted forms became a norm, but the forms
contained limited text because of their size and were policed by
doctrines such as unconscionability and reasonable expectations. As
judicial policing has weakened,131 the online context has given
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. A BRIDGE TOO FAR (United Artists 1977) (based on Cornelius Ryan’s 1974
book adapted by William Goldman).
129. CORNELIUS RYAN, A BRIDGE TOO FAR 89 (1974).
130. Preston & McCann, supra note 14, at 168–69.
131. See Cheryl B. Preston, CyberInfants, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 255, 258–62 (2012)
(discussing the lack of judicial pressure on businesses regarding adhesion contracts).
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businesses a cost-free way to attach extraordinarily long, complex,
and one-sided terms to transactions that in the paper world were
governed only by the default provisions of the UCC.132
Professor Kim argues that the rationales for the broad acceptance
of adhesive contracts fail in the online context.133 The lack of
precautionary signals accompanying contracts online has two
significant implications. The first is obvious: online consumers are
not aware of the extent to which they are bound to elaborate terms
and so fail to push back.134 The second is more important: real world
providers of services and products shy away from elaborate terms
because of the ways in which they would increase customer resistance
and thus increase the costs of doing business.135 Because these
restraints on businesses are absent online, businesses succumb to the
temptation to throw in much longer and more complex terms in
more kinds of transactions than they can in a paper world.
Professor Kim’s book describes various factors that make wrap
contracts uniquely dangerous.136 I agree with her list of distinctions,
and add some additional reasons why online consumption is
different. E-commerce is very informal and quick. When visiting a
website, a consumer does not need to get dressed, drive to a store, or
stand in line to check out. There is nothing on a website that works
to slow the urge for instant gratification. Transactions can be
completed without any serious thought and consumers may sign up
for products or services they believe are free or cheap without any
concept that legal obligations are involved. Although a user can, in
theory, explore a website for an unlimited time before making a
purchasing decision, few actually do. A website does not put users in
a room with an employee presenting a multipage document to whom
questions can be directed and resistance can be expressed. Other
customers need not wait while the sales clerk tries to justify an
132. See U.C.C. § 2-326(1) (“[u]nless otherwise agreed); id. § 2-327(1) (“unless
otherwise agreed”).
133. See KIM, supra note 9, at 162 (arguing that judges would fail basic classes in
contracts when they “borrow phrases from one case and transport them to another
without regard for the context,” such as with online agreements); see also Preston &
McCann, supra note 14, at 134 (delineating the differences between paper adhesion
contracts and online adhesion contracts).
134. See KIM, supra note 9, at 164–65 (explaining that wrap contracts often include
complicated terms and require blanket assent achieved through a single click).
135. See id. (describing that companies are not afraid to include extreme terms in
wrap contracts).
136. See id. at 162 (explaining that wrap contracts are not likely to be read and can
involve underaged consumers).
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onerous contract. Ultimately, the sales clerk likely cannot negotiate
any changes, but the cost of providing a forum for consumer concern
induces businesses to make terms shorter, simpler, and fairer. For
these reasons, merchants impose elaborate contractual terms much
less frequently in the physical shopping world.
Even in those cases where a multipage contract is required in the
paper world, the actions of seeing the formal print, sensing the
contract’s weight or length, and affixing one’s signature are
cautionary in ways an online contract is not. Kim disputes the claim
that following a hyperlink “‘simply takes a person to another page of
the contract, similar to turning the page of a written paper
contract’ . . . [because] turning a page is a naturally flowing,
progressive act whereas clicking on a hyperlink is a disruptive
activity.”137 Flipping through a paper in one’s hand is more natural
than scrolling down or up to find a link and taking the diversion to
another page before going forward.
Finally, the nature of Internet use allows more powerful parties to
intentionally reduce the chances of the user reading and
comprehending a long, technical document. Blanket assent is
senseless when companies use too many scattered, weightless terms
and design contracts that go unnoticed.138 The legally-significant
differences in the context of online contracting have been noted by
the Federal Trade Commission:
[M]any online consumers exhibit certain characteristics, including
inattention, unwarranted confidence, exuberance, and a desire for
immediate gratification, which make them less likely to see and
read disclosures . . . . [A]s result of these online characteristics,
consumers become ‘click-happy’ and quickly navigate through
webpages, without paying much attention because they believe
nothing will go wrong and want to complete the transaction as
rapidly as possible. As a result, consumers often do not read or
understand the terms . . . .139

As a result of these factors, drafters can reliably assume that almost
no one reads the contract terms.140 I agree with Professor Kim that
various wrap layouts suggest that “companies intentionally design
137. Id. at 162 (footnote omitted) (quoting Hubbert v. Dell Corp., 835 N.E.2d
113, 121 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005)).
138. Id. at 200.
139. FED. TRADE COMM’N, NEGATIVE OPTIONS: A REPORT BY THE STAFF OF THE FTC’S
DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT ii–iii (2009). The FTC is aware of these risks but has taken
no steps to require business practices that mitigate the opportunities for abuse.
140. KIM, supra note 9, at 122 (“[I]t simply does not matter whether the consumer
has read the terms—the assumption . . . is that she will not have done so.”).
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contracts to escape user attention.”141 Additionally, as I discuss further
below, even if consumers read the terms, their opportunity to reject
certain terms or choose other suppliers is basically nonexistent.142
Thus, the law’s approach to adhesion contracts that developed over
the last century becomes so much more tenuous and fictional online.
The context in cyberspace is different, and the law should account
for the increased opportunity for abuses.143
Because of the
significantly weaker forms of notice online and because of the
significantly longer and more complex terms online, consumers
cannot be expected to read and comprehend these contracts. The
presumption that they may be bound without reading becomes
increasingly unfair.
Something is lost in translating the law developed in a more
judicially activist climate that applied to standard pre-printed forms
consisting of a few lines on the back of a receipt to the tomes that
hide behind a hyperlink. As Chief Judge Shepherd said, when
confronted with a software issue, “when courts try to pour new wine
into old legal bottles, we sometimes miss the nuances.”144
2.

Scope of the duty to read rule
The duty to read rule has many positive aspects. By imposing the
duty to read, courts simultaneously protect the drafting party from
being blindsided by the other party’s negligence, while also
encouraging the non-drafting party to become familiar with the terms
so that the objective action of signing the contract accurately reflects
the non-drafting party’s subjective intent. Any kind of exception to
this duty to read rule comes with some risk of a perverse incentive.
Courts are generally justified in saying that Jill may not dispute a

141. Id. at 200.
142. Id. at 122.
143. See Preston & McCann, supra note 14, at 164 (suggesting that courts have
disregarded basic principles of contract formation and ignore the “violence [of
adhesion contracts] to core private law assumptions of free and knowing choice”).
144. Conwell v. Gray Loon Outdoor Mktg. Grp., 906 N.E.2d 805, 812 (Ind. 2009);
see also Serenity Springs, Inc. v. LaPorte Cnty. Convention & Visitors Bureau, 13
N.E.3d 487, 494 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
[P]rinciples . . . were enunciated in a time when men drove a cart and horse
and life proceeded more slowly but they are difficult to apply to an era where
messages can be sent at the speed of light and goods can be purchased by
the push of a button. Although it is ‘frequently feasible to pour new wine into old legal bottles,’ here, the old rule—albeit still valid—simply cannot keep
up with the modern advances in technology.
Id. (quoting Felscher v. Univ. of Evansville, 755 N.E.2d 589, 599 (Ind. 2001)).
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clause in a contract with Jack because she could have taken action
before formation if she had read the contract and discovered the
clause. The law should encourage sober, adult parties to be diligent
in protecting themselves rather than burdening the court system after
the fact. But perhaps an exception should be found if Jill is justified
in not reading the contract.
So far, only two significant exceptions to the duty to read rule exist.
The most developed exception applies in fraudulent inducement
cases.145 The fraudulent inducement exception may cover cases
where the fraud victim was grossly negligent in failing to read.146 The
Fifth Circuit explained that, when “an individual who imprudently
executes a contract without reading it . . . [and] signs a contract in
reliance upon fraudulent misrepresentations as to its contents,” the
court is willing to override even the “gross negligence” of failing to
read, so it can address the more serious fraud problem.147 In White v.
Union Producing Co.,148 the non-reader “had the right to rely upon the
representations made to her . . . although the means of correct
information were within reach.”149 A 2003 federal court in Mississippi
praised the duty to read rule by stating that to allow someone to
admit that he signed a contract but did not read or understand it
would “absolutely destroy the value of all contracts.”150 But in almost
the next breath, the court determined that the failure to read in that
case was no longer problematic once the other party is shown to be
guilty of fraudulent inducement.151
Notwithstanding strong language in some cases, the failure to read
may bar recovery even if fraud is alleged.152 In theory, the fraudulent
145. 27 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 92, § 69:35 (“[I]f a party has
fraudulently misrepresented a document’s contents or induced the other party to
refrain from reading the document, courts will allow a remedy, choosing not to
permit a positively fraudulent party to prosper because of the stupidity or credulity of
the defrauded party, subject only to the rights of innocent third parties. In short, the
law should not give any assistance to a knave, a scoundrel or a con artist who preys
upon the less alert or more naive members of society.” (footnotes omitted)).
146. But see id. (“[C]ourts typically will not grant relief when simply reading the
written instrument would settle the issue.”).
147. White v. Union Producing Co., 140 F.2d 176, 178 (5th Cir. 1944).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 178.
150. Anderson v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the United States, 248 F. Supp.
2d 584, 590 (S.D. Miss. 2003) (quoting Turner v. Terry, 799 So. 2d 25, 36 (Miss. 2001)).
151. Id. at 591.
152. See, e.g., Regensburger v. China Adoption Consultants, Ltd., 138 F.3d 1201,
1207 (7th Cir. 1998) (“A party who could have discovered the fraud by reading the
contract, and in fact had an opportunity to do so, cannot later be heard to complain
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inducement “rule[s] operate[] on innocent as well as intentional
misrepresentations.”153 Where a misrepresentation is negligent,
however, some courts find it insufficient to overcome an integration
clause, and thus evidence of the misrepresentation cannot even be
admitted.154 In addition, a court may find that entering a contract
without reading its terms to be so unreasonable that it negates
reliance on the other party in an arm’s length transaction
notwithstanding the other party’s misrepresentations.155 When the
that the contractual terms bind her.”); Anderson, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 591 (quoting
Godfrey, Bassett & Kuykendall Architects, Ltd. v. Huntington Lumber & Supply Co.,
584 So. 2d 1254, 1259 (Miss. 1991)) (failure to read a contract possibly is
negligence); Gardiner v. McDaniel, 415 S.E.2d 303, 304 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (“[I]n
the absence of special circumstances one must exercise ordinary diligence in making
an independent verification of contractual terms and representations, failure to do
which will bar [a defense] based on fraud.” (second alteration in original) (quoting
Moran v. NAV Servs., 377 S.E.2d 909 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989))); Belleville Nat’l Bank v.
Rose, 456 N.E.2d 281, 284 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (“The defense of fraud is, in most
situations, unavailable to avoid the effect of the written agreement where the
complaining party could have discovered the fraud by reading the instrument, and
was in fact afforded a full opportunity to do so.”); see also Alan M. White & Cathy
Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 233, 251 (2002)
(“Even the doctrine of fraud . . . has offered little (and highly unpredictable) relief
from the duty to read.”). The fraud often must interfere with the actual ability to
read. White & Mansfeld, supra, at 251–52. Some courts have held that reliance on
the fraudulent statements is unreasonable if the misrepresentation does not prevent
the party from reading the document. See, e.g., Del Raso v. United States, 244 F.3d
567, 571 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Spartan Leasing Inc. v. Pollard, 400 S.E.2d 476, 479–
80 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991)).
153. Anderson, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 591 (quoting Godfrey, Bassett & Kuykendall
Architects, 584 So. 2d at 1259).
154. See, e.g., Psenicska v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 409 F. App’x 368,
371–72 (2d Cir. 2009); Sound Techniques, Inc. v. Hoffman, 737 N.E.2d 920, 921
(Mass. App. Ct. 2000). See generally UAW-GM Human Res. Ctr. v. KSL Recreation
Corp., 579 N.W.2d 411, 416 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (explaining that integration clauses
express the desire of parties to be bound only by what is written in the agreement).
155. Barnes v. Burger King Corp., 932 F. Supp. 1420, 1427 (S.D. Fla. 1996)
(holding that the defendant disclosed its encroachment policy in the offering
circular and in the franchise agreement and thus an attempt to conceal another
document is irrelevant); Russell Korobkin, The Borat Problem in Negotiation: Fraud,
Assent, and the Behavioral Law and Economics of Standard Form Contracts, 101 CALIF. L.
REV. 51, 66 (2013) (citing Citibank, N.A. v. Plapinger, 485 N.E.2d 974, 976–77 (N.Y.
1985)) (suggesting that relying on oral statements is never reasonable when a written
document contradicts a statement regardless of the presence of a non-reliance
clause); see also Steinbeck v. Steinbeck Heritage Found., 400 F. App’x 572, 577–78
(2d Cir. 2010) (citing Capricorn Investors III, L.P. v. Coolbrands Int’l, Inc., 886
N.Y.S.2d 158, 159 (App. Div. 2009)) (denying recovery where plaintiff relied on oral
promise that conflicts with contract’s no oral modification clause); Ruffino v.
Neiman, 794 N.Y.S.2d 228, 229 (App. Div. 2005) (“Reasonable reliance on the
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contract contains a clause disclaiming reliance on representations
from the other party, the failure to read issue becomes more
complex. In these cases Professor Russell Korobkin argues that
courts split at least four ways when dealing with contracts where the
non-drafting party claims that the drafting party made oral promises
contrary to the written contract.156 Largely, this split results because
of questions about what underlying legal framework is most relevant
to such contracts, contract law or tort law.157 The case of fraudulent
inducement illustrates that courts may see past the duty to read to
combat fraud, but it offers insufficient precedent to argue that failure
to read can be excused in other circumstances.
3.

The duty to read and unconscionability
The other exception to the duty to read arises under the
procedural prong of the doctrine of unconscionability. If there were
impropriety in the process of entering a contract, a court may

alleged misrepresentations is a necessary element of both fraudulent and negligent
misrepresentations and, where the alleged misrepresentations conflict with the terms
of a written agreement, there can be no reasonable reliance as a matter of law.”
(citations omitted)).
Courts are more likely to excuse failure to read when the fraudulent statements
themselves induced reliance without reading. Some jurisdictions, however, take a
harsher view towards those who fail to read. See generally 66 AM. JUR. 2D Reformation of
Instruments § 87 (2015).
[A] contracting party is negligent if he or she relies upon the other party’s
statement and signs the contract without reading it. . . . Pursuant to some
statutes, a failure to read an instrument before signing or accepting it. . . has
been held to constitute a bar to reformation where relief is sought on the
ground of mistake induced by false representations . . . [when] the
circumstances were such that the complaining party, by the exercise of
reasonable diligence, could have obtained knowledge of the truth.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
156. Korobkin, supra note 155, at 70. Korobkin’s first category are those cases
where courts simply “follow the complaint,” meaning that they analyze the case
under the principles presented in the plaintiff’s pleading. Id. at 63. Plaintiffs
typically present the dispute in a tort-oriented fraud framework that permits courts to
circumvent the preference for signed writings under the parol evidence rule. Id. at
64. Courts using the second approach purport to analyze such cases in terms of
fraud but instead effectively enforce the parol evidence rule. Id. at 64–65. The third
approach keys on the distinction between “fraud in the inducement” and “fraud in
the execution.” Id. at 68. “[T]he reasoning is that the parol evidence rule precludes
a claim of ‘she promised me X,’ but it does not preclude a claim of ‘she told me the
document promises X.’” Id. The fourth and final approach is “[s]cienter-[b]ased,”
relying on intentional or reckless prior false representations regarding the quality or
extent of consideration. Id. at 69.
157. Id. at 57.
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combine that with evidence of severe terms to find the contract
unconscionable.158 If a contract is unconscionable, failure to read
loses significance.
The factors that suggest procedural
unconscionability include the lack of adequate opportunity to read
the contract based on time pressure or failure to give a copy of the
contract, and knowingly taking advantage of deficiencies in language,
education or diminished capacity of the other party based on age,
health, immediate distress, or similar circumstances.159 Procedural
factors are often listed by courts but without independent
significance and operate only as add-ons to more egregious
circumstances. These factors include disparity in bargaining power,
adhesion, industry-wide monopoly on terms, and contracts for
necessities.160 Procedural unconscionability may ease the court’s
concern with failure to read, but a person of average education and
language skills, who is not known to be in a present crisis mode, who
has access to a computer and is involved in social media or online
shopping is not likely to sustain a procedural unconscionability claim,
notwithstanding the existence of the secondary factors.
Professor Robert Hillman is concerned that merely giving
customers the opportunity to read will result in courts being unable
to find procedural unconscionability.161 He argues that mandatory
disclosures may backfire by making questionable terms enforceable
while doing nothing to increase reading or encourage businesses to

158. See, e.g., Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 363 (Utah 1996) (excusing a patient’s
failure to read an arbitration agreement because of the “rushed and hurried”
manner in which her assent was obtained just minutes before going into surgery); see
also 27 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 92, § 70:113 (“[T]he duty to read and
understand the terms of a contract before signing it is obviated when a party’s failure
to read the agreement results from procedurally unconscionable behavior of an
opposing party . . . .”).
159. See Sosa, 924 P.2d at 362 (highlighting the “[f]actors bearing on procedural
unconscionability”); 8 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 92, § 18:10 (noting that
procedural unconscionability “relates to procedural deficiencies in the contract
formation process, such as deception or a refusal to bargain over contract terms”); see
also Mazur v. eBay Inc., No. C 07-03967, 2008 WL 618988, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4,
2008) (defining unconscionability as “oppression and surprise”).
160. Sosa, 924 P.2d at 362; see 8 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 92, § 18:14
(“[T]he greater the harshness or unreasonableness of the substantive terms, the
less important the regularity of the process of contract formation that gave rise to
the term becomes.”).
161. See Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Web Site Disclosure of
e-Standard Terms Backfire?, in BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS,
supra note 99, at 83, 92–93 (positing that forced disclosure would “legal[ly] backfire”
since it “would narrow consumer rights rather than expand them”).
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draft reasonable terms.162 Curiously, by “mandatory disclosures” he
means only requiring a business display on its homepage the terms of
its browsewrap or a clearly identified hyperlink to terms.163 In
essence, then, he argues that if there is a clickwrap or a clearly
identified link on a homepage, sufficient notice exists to satisfy the
procedural prong and thus makes a ruling of unconscionability quite
unlikely.164 If the existence of a mere link is sufficient to reach this
result, then an admission of having followed the link and read any
part of the wrap is utterly damning.165
In some cases, the court specifically notes that the plaintiff’s
admission of having read at least part of the contract or the notice of
a change in the contract is important to its decision.166 This point is
illustrated in some very recent cases. In Rodriguez v. Instagram, LLC,167
an Instagram user, who read the terms enough to learn how to opt
out of the new arbitration provision, filed a complaint in federal
court alleging the unilateral modification of the contract was a
breach of the duty of good faith.168 Obviously aware of the new
terms, the user continued to use her Instagram account, and the
court found this to be a knowing acceptance of the new terms.169 The
court distinguished this case from Badie v. Bank of America,170 where
the court held that the use of a unilateral change of terms provision
to implement a forced arbitration agreement, that was avoidable only
by closing one’s account, violated requirements of “good faith and

162. Id. at 83–84.
163. Id. at 83.
164. Id. at 84, 92–93.
165. Hillman explains that most states require both procedural and substantive
unconscionability to strike a contract clause. Terms that are “insufficiently
outlandish” to warrant the extremely rare holding that they are unenforceable
merely as a matter of substantive unconscionability will be enforced because the
opportunity to read removes the procedural unconscionability. Id. at 92–93.
166. Recent examples abound. For instance, in enforcing a gym membership
contract, the court comments that the plaintiff, who did not graduate from high
school, “admit[ted] she read and understood the agreement” when it enforced the
contract. Ramirez v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc., No. H-12-1922, 2013 WL 2152113, at
*5 (S.D. Tex. May 16, 2013), aff’d, 549 F. App’x 262 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). In
Pennsylvania, a court enforced an arbitration clause in relation to a suit arising from
the murder of an assisted care facility resident by another resident where the plaintiff
“indicated that she read and understood the agreement.” Estate of Hodges v.
Meadows, No. 12-cv-01698, 2013 WL 1294480, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2013).
167. No. CGC-13-532875, 2014 WL 895438 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 28, 2014).
168. Id. at *1–2.
169. Id. at *2–4.
170. 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
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fair dealing.”171 The notice in Badie, which was included with
monthly bills and notices, “was not designed to achieve knowing
consent” to the new provision.172 Nothing suggests that the plaintiff
actually saw or read the terms. In contrast, the plaintiff in Rodriguez
“had a full and perfectly reasonable opportunity to read, and did
read, the New Terms; she could have declined the revised
agreement.”173 The party prevailed who did not read the new terms
notice.174 Thus, the customer’s best chance is remaining ignorant
until the business attempts to enforce the terms in a wrap contract.
III. SEEKING SOLUTIONS TO SAVE WRAPS
How can the risks of wraps be reduced? Intuitively, it makes sense
to base the enforcement of wrap contracts on the concepts of the
duty to read and sufficient notice. Once on notice that contract
terms exist, adults in our society are expected to realize that legal
consequences will attach and take responsibility to determine the
risks. Courts assume that those acting with reasonable diligence will
then find the terms, read them, and decide whether to negotiate for
better terms or take their business elsewhere.175 Thus, most of the
efforts to bring sense to wrap contracts have focused on notice,
although there are a few notable exceptions, such as Professor
Radin’s suggested limits on the power of private ordering.176
Requiring notice of the terms so the non-drafting party can shop
around facilitates resolution by the market itself, and thus, such
proposals are more acceptable to Adam Smith economists.177
Requiring notice may work well in theory, but in the online reality,

171. Id. at 284.
172. Id. at 290 (internal quotation marks omitted).
173. Rodriguez, 2014 WL 895438, at *3.
174. See id.
175. Woodrow Hartzog, Website Design as Contract, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1635, 1644
(2011) (“[I]f the terms of a contract are reasonably communicated, the offeree
cannot be absolved from liability for failing to read them because the offeree had a
legal duty to do so.”); Charles L. Knapp, Contract Law Walks the Plank: Carnival
Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 12 NEV. L.J. 553, 556–57 (2012) (explaining how
countless courts hold a duty to read as necessary to contract law and assume that a
party with notice has “an ‘option’ to reject those terms—no matter how brief the
window of opportunity that existed for the adhering party actually to read,
understand and react to them”).
176. See RADIN, supra note 12, at 189–96 (suggesting filtering systems for personal
computers that would alert the user to boilerplate provisions).
177. See id. (describing various market solutions for boilerplate contract issues).
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most forms of notice do not convey sufficient useful information to
function as intended.
The duty to read rule suggests that if a contract can be found,
individuals are expected to read and comprehend it before
proceeding. Because no one believes online customers read wrap
contracts (or realistically could), a more astute analysis must consider
whether users are given sufficient notice—not just of the contract’s
existence, but also the terms of the contract—to ensure a
knowledgeable choice. This Part reviews a variety of proposals for
mitigating the excesses of wrap contracts, most of which focus on
notice. All of the proposals offer improvements and seem viable,
but none is sufficient.
A. Notice Proposals
The most common proposals address the sufficiency of notice, with
a few creative but limited suggestions.178
Many proposals provide notice by slowing the process of
acceptance online such that a reasonable user will recognize that the
terms are important enough to read. Professor Juliet Moringiello
suggests, for example, that courts look for more significant actions
indicating assent than merely clicking, so that the electronic
acceptance actions more closely resemble the solemnity and
psychological weightiness associated with applying an actual signature
to paper contracts.179 One of her suggestions would require users to
type their initials near various terms.180
Professor Kim proffers some similar ideas. For example, she
suggests that parties entering into contracts engage in “multiple
178. Professor Kim’s book, for example, offers various creative suggestions for
giving notice such as labeling the wrap contracts as “Your Legal Obligations” instead
of the more innocuous-sounding “Terms” or “Conditions of Use,” KIM, supra note 9,
at 186, making notice of the terms more visible and readable on the webpage, see id.
at 187 (finding that a drafter who wants a reader to read the terms would not use
“multiwrapping”), giving short notices indicating actions that will soon be taken (i.e.
installation of software), see id. at 184 (explaining that short notices are effective at
informing customers about the product), and providing notice of terms to users in
the same way users may provide notice to the company, see id. at 192 (referring to this
as the “‘turnabout is fair play’ rule”). She would also prohibit the drafting party from
making unilateral changes to the contract unless the law has changed. See id. at 202.
179. See Juliet M. Moringiello, Signals, Assent and Internet Contracting, 57 RUTGERS
L. REV. 1307, 1347 (2005) (discussing that clicking does not often mean much to
the average consumer and that, “[i]f judges find that this is the case, they could
require Internet vendors to be more explicit, by requiring a more affirmative act
than simply a click”).
180. Id.
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clicking,” where the consumer clicks “next” to see specific
provisions of the contract, signaling an assent to specific parts of the
contract individually.181
Other examples of Professor Kim’s suggestions include requiring
consumers to type out and email assent to the contract to the service
provider,182 or requiring better visual presentation of the online
contract within the website or domain so the user is confronted with
a visual of what rights are given up and what claims are waived.183
Courts could draw a bright line that indicates how strong a term must
be to require this individual assent.184 Wraps that “obtain rights
belonging to the nondrafting party that are not directly created from
the drafting party’s license or promise,”185 such as a right granted to
the drafting party to exploit intellectual property and images posted
by the user,186 for instance, would require such individual assent.
Greater visibility would be, of course, a positive development in
educating users that terms exist and that some are more important
than others, a fact that might be missed if a person began reading the
wrap and lost interest before reaching the overreaching terms. These
suggestions, along with the multiple clicking and initialing approach,
at the very least, should make consumers more aware that they are
entering into binding agreements that warrant further thought.
Unfortunately, these proposals based on signaling the existence
and the weightiness of the transaction have some flaws. These extra
assent requirements assume that the problems associated with online
contracts are primarily about the newness of the forum and the not
yet widely understood significance of clicking or merely browsing.
Unfortunately, online customers have shown little interest in further
thought when other circumstances should have warned them.
Clicking a box, scrolling down a set of terms, or clicking “continue”

181. KIM, supra note 9, at 196–97. Essentially this proposal is that courts should
require that some specific kinds of terms must be directly, specifically assented to by
the user to be enforced. Id. She argues that requiring such individual assent would
help to eliminate concern that a court is holding a consumer to an unusually
burdensome term that she never knew existed. Id.
182. Id. at 198 (arguing that the process of requiring the user to manually type his
or her consent in an email helps to ensure the user is aware of his or her obligations
under the contract).
183. Id. at 186.
184. Id. at 195 (“In other words, sword and crook provisions . . .[should] require
specific assent but shield provisions do not.”).
185. Id.
186. See id. at 52 (describing that companies often “use crook provisions to resell
and share customer personal information”).
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have become such common actions that they have lost their ability to
impress on the mind of consumers the significance of what they are
doing. Similarly, these extra actions would lose their luster as they
become more routine. The Internet-instant-gratification generation
will come to see the required action as a mere time-wasting hurdle
slowing their access to the desired product or service. Undoubtedly,
consumers will quickly adopt routines for entering the required
initials or typing out “I accept” without a single thought or, more
likely, they will program their computer to do the required action.
Kim admits, “[t]he goal of a specific assent requirement is not to
ensure that users read online contracts; rather[,] the goal is to
introduce a transactional hurdle that signals the burdensome nature
of the transaction.”187 Just as clicking “I accept” is a better warning
than that provided by browsewraps, these additional hurdles provide
more meaningful notice to the consumer. However, they will quickly
become meaningless, if users do not take significant action in
response to the signal, such as reading the terms.
Further, these extra affirmative actions by consumers do nothing to
convey the legal implications of the terms so that an intelligent
decision about going forward can be made, nor do they do anything
about the lack of negotiation power held by consumers. Even if the
user reads the wrap and finds offensive terms, what then? A better
suggestion may be to require the user to type out “I realize I have
waived everything,” and maybe “I realize I have granted valuable
rights to the service provider beyond the payment of money.” The
fundamental flaw remains: many of the terms are inherently unfair
and unreasonable, but the user has no option besides accepting the
terms as written or not obtaining the goods or services. Shopping for
another vendor is not much of an option if the consumer does not
know what terms would provide more protection.
Professor Edith Warkentine offers a different proposal, a more
elaborate scheme requiring notice that terms exist, express actions
showing assent, and a requirement that the drafter provide an
explanation of the meaning of terms.188 She argues that, if terms are
burdensome, they should be enforceable only when courts can
identify “knowing assent” in the process.189 She defines “knowing
187. Id. at 197.
188. See Edith R. Warkentine, Beyond Unconscionability: The Case for Using “Knowing
Assent” as the Basis for Analyzing Unbargained-for Terms in Standard Form Contracts, 31
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 469, 473 (2008) (advocating for courts to use her “knowing
assent” analysis which contains the above three elements).
189. Id.
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assent” by three criteria:
(1) the conspicuousness of the
unbargained-for term; (2) the existence of an explanation of the
importance of the term; and (3) an objective manifestation of assent
that is separate from the general manifestation of intent to enter into
a contract as a whole.190 If courts were to incorporate these three
elements, they would make progress in policing wrap contracts. One
problem arises in defining words like “conspicuousness,”
“unbargained-for,” “explanation,” and “objective manifestation” of
separate assent.191 Another issue is convincing courts to make the
investment to delve into weighing the burden of terms and the
factual complexities. The latter issue persists in the variety of
suggested solutions discussed in the following subpart.
B. Increased Judicial Scrutiny Proposals
Several proposals for taming wrap contracts ask the courts to
reassess the level of scrutiny of the procedural aspects and substantive
content of wraps. They offer various standards for determining if
wraps are enforceable. Courts certainly can, and should, increase the
scrutiny and develop common law standards of fairness in the online
context. These proposals, however, are not sufficient in the current
jurisprudential climate to make a significant change.
Professor Clayton Gillette argues that, in regards to standard form
contracts, courts can overlook the lack of knowing assent so long as
the parties’ best interests in entering into the agreement are being
served.192 Gillette explains that the contracting parties are best
prepared to represent their own interests; thus, if the parties are
actively participating in the fulfillment of contractual obligations, the
appropriate assumption is that the justifications for requiring assent
have been fulfilled.193 If they are not knowingly involved in selecting
terms, then the court should draw parameters around the ability of
the more powerful party to impose adhesion terms based on an
implied-in-fact type standard.194 “To the extent [courts] enforce

190. Id.
191. See id. (using these terms as part of the “knowing assent” framework).
192. Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 W IS . L.
R EV . 679, 681.
193. Id. (arguing that rolling contracts “[p]ermit parties to reach agreement over
basic terms . . . but leave until a later time, usually simultaneous with the delivery or
first use of the goods, the presentation of additional terms that the buyer can accept,
often by simply using the good, or reject, by returning it”).
194. See id. (reflecting the strategy of powerful sellers to systematically gain
advantages over the buyer by discouraging the buyer from reading the contract).
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these additional terms, [they] do so because [they] think that the
parties either would or should have agreed to them or to terms
sufficiently similar that it would not have been cost-effective to
bargain for the alternative.”195 Of course, online customers are not
involved in selecting terms beyond price and a product or service
description. This proposal would require courts to strike boilerplate
terms that do not serve customer interests. Such a doctrine, without
extreme limitations and confinement to particularly egregious terms,
opens a huge gap where self-serving parties can dispute their own
prior choices and raise alternative theories about what is in their best
interests. While serving the best interests of parties is generally
desired in contract law, at least insomuch as contract law seeks
efficient facilitation of market transactions, it is inappropriate to view
this as the sole or primary goal of the assent requirement. The legal
system cannot absorb the number of parties who will seek to have
contracts rescinded or reformed after realizing they have made an
error of judgment if the test is what, in the judge’s view, is in the
parties’ best interests.
Professor Robert Lloyd argues for what he calls the “circle of
assent.”196 Like Professors Kim and Moringeillo, he argues that terms
should require levels of notice based on how overreaching each one
is.197 Then courts could use a sliding scale of readability and notice
considered against the burdensomeness of the terms to measure
assent.198 Unlike the notice proposals in the prior subpart that
motivate the user to take more time in indicating assent, this rule
seeks the same objective by requiring online businesses to post more
warning flags, prompting the consumer to pay special attention to
surprising or especially limiting terms.199 Lloyd’s circle of assent
doctrine directs the court to “engage in a totality of the

195. Id.
196. See Robert M. Lloyd, The “Circle of Assent” Doctrine: An Important Innovation in
Contract Law, 7 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 237, 239 (2006) (defining the
doctrine as the parties “will be bound by the provisions in the form over which the
parties actually bargained and such other provisions that are not unreasonable”
given the surrounding circumstances (quoting Parton v. Mark Pirtle OldsmobileCadillac-Isuzu, Inc., 730 S.W.2d 634, 637–38 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987))).
197. See id. at 260 (noting an arbitration clause buried in a computer’s
documentation may be enforceable while a clause relinquishing an employee’s right
to a jury trial that is buried in a handbook should not be enforceable).
198. Id. at 247.
199. See id. at 259–60 (stating a company should make an arbitration clause clear,
conspicuous, and possibly in a separate document to ensure enforceability).
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circumstances analysis and determine whether it really is fair to bind
the customer to this term.”200
As with requiring more deliberate acceptance, requiring warning
flags is a vast improvement over the current system. However, the
nature of terms that require warnings and the form of the warnings
warrant further exploration. The acceptance of this approach
requires courts to change the test for notice. Under the existing,
but under-used, unconscionability doctrine, courts can look at the
totality of the circumstances and stack up factors suggesting a lack
of procedural fairness. However, courts have not accepted the
invitation to use aggressively the unconscionability doctrine to
police wrap contracts.201 If courts become motivated to shine a
more realistic light on wrap contracts, weighing substance and
notice tied to specific types of terms would be a reasonable
approach, but judicial willingness to do that has been limited.
Judges may be reluctant to make normative decisions weighing in
each case the severity of the clauses and the realistic impact of the
warnings. A concrete statute or agency regulation, drawing clear
distinctions and defining adequate warnings, would be more effective.
Providing more analysis and application to the circle of assent
concept, Professor John Murray argues that contract interpretation
is ultimately a work of the “judicial vision” of contract.202 He urges
courts to be more willing to attempt to shape contractual law in
socially beneficial ways, rather than hopelessly attempting to
“discover” the inherent meaning of the contract.203 Murray rejects
the “plain meaning” mode of contract interpretation as literally
impossible, and therefore a nonsensical ideal.204 Interpretation is
ultimately done by the court itself after considering “whatever
objective manifestations are available to determine what terms they

200. Id. at 263–64. In describing the test, Lloyd includes two basic factors: “1) the
extent to which the customer should have been aware of the provision; and 2) the
extent to which the provision shifts to the customer a risk the customer was not
expecting.” Id. at 246. This sliding scale would take into account factors that lend
themselves to arguing for both procedural and substantive unconscionability. See id.
at 263–64. In other words, where an action or term posed by the offending party
appears to contain elements of unconscionability but is not necessarily egregious
enough to meet high unconscionability standards, the complaining party will still be
able to use these facts as evidence that assent did not properly occur.
201. See supra Part II.C.3.
202. See John E. Murray, Jr., The Judicial Vision of Contract: The Constructed Circle of
Assent and Unconscionability, 52 DUQ. L. REV. 263, 267–69 (2014).
203. See id.
204. Id. at 267–68 & n.21.
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deem appropriate for inclusion in the constructed circle of assent
they create, regardless of the actual intention of the parties.”205
Accordingly, changing judicial attitudes is the only reasonable
reform. Murray continues, “[e]ven where the language of an
agreement presents no troubling issue concerning its meaning, its
interpretation may be subject to an overriding policy.”206 Murray
points to the historical tendency to enforce charitable promises in
the absence of traditional validation devices and to read antiassignment clauses as narrowly as possible.207
Indeed, courts of the consumer protection era were fairly
aggressive in applying policy restraints to private ordering.208 Courts
have the tools of unconscionability and good faith doctrines, which
would enable them to take action.209 But current trends have covered
existing doctrines with dust as discussed in Part I.210 Now, most courts
fear being labeled as activist and, being more enamored with law and
economics jurisprudence, tend to believe they advance economic
policy by enforcing contract language as the drafter intended without
concern for the user’s intent.211 If judicial resistance to extending
already-weakened contract doctrines into new forms of business
practice is not established early, it is very unlikely to come later when
the practices become common and judges measure reasonableness
against the industry norm. Online contracts had a chance at a fresh
perspective and largely missed it.
Moreover, most wrap contracts require arbitration, and many
commentators allege there is systemic unfairness and bias that favors
businesses in arbitration.212 Because arbitrators are only paid if hired
205. Id. at 266–67.
206. Id. at 390.
207. Id. at 391.
208. See Preston & McCann, supra note 14, at 151–52.
209. See Juliet M. Moringiello & William L. Reynolds, From Lord Coke to Internet
Privacy: The Past, Present, and Future of the Law of Electronic Contracting, 72 MD. L. REV.
452, 453 n.8, 468–69 (2013).
210. See supra Part I (finding the old doctrines are less applicable to the longer
and more complex online contracts).
211. See Preston & McCann, supra note 14, at 166–69 (chronicling various
Supreme Court and circuit cases while arguing that newly developed trends
demonstrate courts have accepted implications of the drafter’s intent rather than
manifestations of a user’s knowing assent).
212. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion
Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 704 (2012) (discussing how consumers are
negatively impacted by a recent court decision allowing companies to be protected
from class actions through arbitration clauses); Letter from Richard M. Alderman et
al., Professors of Consumer Law & Banking Law, to Senators Dodd and Shelby and
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for a particular case, arguments against arbitration are often based on
what is perceived as “repeat-arbitrator bias”—the idea that the
arbitrator will favor the repeat players who are more likely to hire
future arbitrators.213 Some recent studies suggest that the research
on which this negative perception is based is incomplete and the
seemingly high rates of business successes in arbitration may be
traced to a combination of factors.214 But no one is arguing that
arbitrators are naturally biased toward consumers. Unlike jurors,
arbitrators are more likely to come from the business sector.215 In
addition, arbitrators want to avoid laying down new policy norms and
to resolve the dispute at hand efficiently without much focus on the
overall social implications of their rulings. The U.S. Supreme Court
advised that “the task of an arbitrator is to interpret and enforce a
contract, not to make public policy.”216 Thus, I argue that proposals
based on courts adopting more stringent standards without any
particular standards are overly optimistic. What is left, then, are new
and more creative ways to warn consumers to look out for themselves,
with the hope that businesses will back off from aggressive terms so
they can keep customers.

Representatives Frank and Bachus 5–6 (Sept. 29, 2009), available at
http://law.hofstra.edu/pdf/Media/consumer-law%209-28-09.pdf
(“Studies . . .
suggest[] that arbitration providers are responding to the incentive to find for those
who select them: the companies that insert their names in their form contracts.”); see
also Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, The Market for Private Dispute Resolution Services—
An Empirical Re-Assessment of ICANN-UDRP Performance, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH.
L. REV. 285, 369–70 (2005) (“[S]tudies have generally criticized the UDRP
providers for being biased towards complainants and for leaving the respondents
without a fair defense.”).
213. See David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1247, 1310 n.178 (2009) (citing Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The
Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189, 209–10 & tbls.2–3 (1997)).
214. See Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, An Empirical Study of AAA
Consumer Arbitrations, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 843, 846 (2010) (finding no
statistically significant repeat-player effect when using a traditional definition, but
finding some evidence of repeat-player effect using an alternative definition, and
concluding that the results suggest repeat players’ success may be a result of better
case screening than arbitrator bias).
215. See Larry J. Pittman, Mandatory Arbitration: Due Process and Other Constitutional
Concerns, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 853, 859 (2011) (“[B]ecause the current composition of
many available pools of arbitrators are non-diverse, possibly biased in favor of repeat
players and disproportionately conservative, consumers, employees, and other
plaintiffs do not have the same opportunities as corporate defendants to choose
decision-makers who might be biased in their favor.”).
216. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 672 (2010).
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IV. TAMING WRAPS
Traditional notions of contract assent and interpretation have
primarily worked to ensure that the actual intentions of the differing
parties are known.217 Transactions and interactions tend to be less
conscious, less negotiable, less tangible, far more frequent, and more
easily hidden in Internet contracting than with traditional standard
forms. Notice proposals assume that the immediacy of Internet
transactions can be overcome. But increasing consumer notice that
terms exist does not adequately address the problems with online
contracts. Most importantly, the issue of comprehensibility remains:
until there are more aggressive standards for presenting terms in
clear and manageable ways, no amount of flashing lights will help.
Most proposals fail to make significant improvements in conveying
usable information, and so the benefits from increased notice are
heavily outweighed by the cumbersome and time-consuming
impositions on the user, who will resent the impositions, act no
differently, and ultimately receive no benefit.
A. Bite-Sized Notice
If courts are going to base enforceability on notice, then the notice
must be such that it quickly provides consumers with sufficient knowledge
to make a reasonable decision about entering into the contract. Useful
notice must reduce the wrap terms down to a concise and
understandable format that allows a reader, within the realistic confines
of time and patience, to recognize the significance of contract terms and
enable efficient comparisons to other product and service providers.
I argue that online contract terms can be commoditized and
standardized in such a way as to make rational comparison shopping a
reality. Most shoppers can process only a limited number of
characteristics of competing products and services. Naturally, the only
features that draw any attention are related to: (1) price, (2)
appearance, (3) size or quantity, and (4) compatibility with the end
use objective. Nonetheless, some detail comparison shopping in even
very small transactions flourishes in a few industries and contexts based
on disclosure of otherwise opaque product features beyond these four.
For example, parents may look for children’s pajamas that are flame
resistant. Many consumers look for and purchase products that are
recycled or recyclable, use less energy, are made in the United States, and
217. See, e.g., Postlewaite v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 411 F.3d 63, 69 (2d Cir. 2005)
(stating a main tenet of contract interpretation is to construe the agreement in
accordance with the parties’ intent).
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so forth. Most grocery shoppers look at the calorie count and contents
on a can or package. Can the legal import of a wrap contract be disclosed
in a way that allows similarly efficient and fast comparison of features?
Professor Amy Schmitz proposed, in the arbitration clause context,
that companies be required to disclose the terms of their arbitration
provisions “in a concise and readable format” through a mandated
simple grid that would be posted on a central website.218 Schmitz
persuasively argues that such a disclosure, at a minimum, would alert
consumers that arbitration provisions are controversial and carry
significant consequences.219 She suggests that bold disclosures “may
prompt consumers to question and perhaps join together to resist or
change overly burdensome arbitration terms.”220 I agree both with the
idea of grid type disclosure and that the ultimate goal is to draw sufficient
attention to these terms that customers begin to ask questions and push.
The best instrument for massive market change is customer protest.
However, I propose something more specific: the “calorie and
content” box for a wrap contract. Consider the following example:
Contract [link to contract] includes:
Mandatory arbitration
Only binds user, not business
Prohibition of suits joined with other
users (class actions)
Place of dispute resolution
Applicable law
Grant to provider of right to use any
content posted by user
Waiver of: all damages
Direct damages
Consequential damages
Incidental damages
Punitive damages
Business’s right to alter contract
without posting notice to user
Business’s right to collect, sort and
store data
For its own use
For the use of its affiliates
To sell to others
User’s right to opt out at [link]

3,453 words (10 standard pages in
print)
Yes
No
Yes
Santa Clara County, CA
California
Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

218. Schmitz, Legislating, supra note 12, at 168–69.
219. See id. at 169–70 (envisioning a central database that may help regulators
(and consumers) be more aware of harsh terms).
220. Id.
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This box is sufficiently direct that a consumer could compare the
boxes of a variety of competitors in a reasonable amount of time.
Although the legal words are not defined, the meaning could be
stated either in lay terms or sufficiently condensed to make using an
online search engine to find a meaning more practicable. Further,
the selection of these clauses for disclosure signals their importance
and a consumer may use such a list as a means for comparison
without fully understanding what each type of clause accomplishes.
Such a form will not introduce significant costs in preparation;
businesses can quickly fill and post the form when attaching a wrap
contract to a site.
Of course, as more types of extreme clauses become common, such
a form may need to be expanded. The public awareness created by
this many disclosures may sufficiently stifle the urge to push the
envelope on expanding business-favoring clauses and provide judges
with a means of identifying the use of such undisclosed, burdensome
terms as unconscionable.
To be effective, such a content box must be posted where
consumers can see it. The box message is sufficiently direct that a
statement of its existence and a link to the page showing the box that
must be followed before proceeding with an “I accept” click beneath
the box may be sufficient.
B. Best Practice Standard
The same effect of alerting customers to extreme terms can be met
by methods other than the conventional posted notice on the site.
Critical to alerting users to an extraordinary contract characteristic is
some determination of what “ordinary expectations” actually are.
Another variation of the wrap contract “content box” would be a
version in which the online service provider must identify what
features of its wrap contract differ from a publicly available
“standard” wrap contract that has been drafted to balance interests
between the parties and recommended for use by a respected entity.
A significant function of the UCC is articulating some carefully
considered, interest-balanced terms that apply automatically unless
changed by agreement.221 One option would require disclosure of
221. See U.C.C. § 1-302(a) (2001) (“[T]he effect of provisions of [the Uniform
Commercial Code] may be varied by agreement.” (alteration in original)). Several
sections of Article 2 expressly note that the rules are default. See, e.g., id. § 2-326(1)
(“[u]nless otherwise agreed”); id. § 2-327(1) (“unless otherwise agreed”); see also
Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
608, 615 (1998) (“[T]the ‘off-the-rack’ provisions of the Uniform Commercial
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variations in wrap terms from those included the UCC. Many
voluntary, private, or collective associations issue standards or “best
practice” guidelines. The American Law Institute (ALI), or another
such organization, could compile one or more options for a
“standard” version of a wrap contract, particularly one that addresses
the limited license of intellectual property, and suggest that these
terms be adopted in most online contexts. The ALI had such an
opportunity when proposing its Principles of Software Contracts (the
“Principles”).222 The principles were drafted as a guide to aid courts
and practitioners in navigating transactions involving software
contracts.223 The Principles, however, missed the opportunity to
provide a set of balanced terms as a standard and focused instead on
the issue of notice in the presentation of online contracts.224 The
Principles have received little attention and have not been cited by
courts in the years since their adoption.225 The American Law
Institute also began a project to create a new restatement covering
consumer contracts.226 Although this effort is intended to “restate”
existing law, a similar project could draft a model of online contracts
containing standard neutral terms.
If such a standard existed, online service providers could save
considerable effort by merely incorporating this standard set of
terms rather than drafting new terms requiring meaningful
additional disclosure. Moreover, a provider could market that it
offers the “best practice” terms, which would be freely available
online for consumers to view. At the least, consumers may be
suspicious of an online service provider that opts not to use the
Code . . . are majoritarian defaults that save most parties the expense of specifying
such terms as time of delivery, place of delivery, or even price in their agreements.”
(citing Ian Ayres, Making a Difference: The Contractual Contributions of Easterbrook and
Fischel, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1391, 1396–97 (1992)).
222. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS (2010).
223. Publications Catalog:
Principles of the Law of Software Contracts, A.L.I.,
http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publications.ppage&node_id=121
(last
visited Mar. 30, 2015).
224. See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 83, at 167 (noting that increased
disclosure could lead to courts to be more lenient when regulating contract terms).
225. As of March 3, 2015 a search in Westlaw using “Principles of Software
Contracts,” “Principles of the Law of Software Contracts,” and “principles /10
software,” returns no relevant cases, other than Conwell v. Gray Loon Outdoor Marketing
Group, 906 N.E.2d 805, 812 (Ind. 2009), where the fact that the ALI had launched
the project was mentioned in passing.
226. See Current Projects: Restatement Third, The Law of Consumer Contracts, A.L.I.,
https://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=projects.proj_ip&projectid=25 (last visited
Mar. 30, 2015).
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standard terms, thus incentivizing online service providers to plainly
disclose and justify any deviations.
C. Limiting Non-Negotiable Terms
Requiring online service providers to make wrap contracts at least
partially negotiable could both resolve the problem of consumer
awareness in wrap contract acceptance and give consumers some
bargaining power. Some user choices could be inserted into these
agreements without eliminating wrap contract efficiency. For
example, certain terms, such as arbitration agreements, venue
restrictions, or modification clauses, could fall into a category of
“necessarily negotiable terms” in wrap contracts. The online service
provider would be required to provide some options regarding
these terms from which a consumer would have to choose during
contract acceptance. An option to exclude a term could possibly be
tied to a price if drafters show restraint in actually reflecting the
increased cost in the price and not setting a price so high as to be a
punishment or penalty for choosing the option. If a choice of
venue clause is contained in a wrap contract, the online service
provider would be required to allow the consumer to choose
between two different venues and affirmatively accept one during
the contracting process. Or, for contract modification clauses, the
online service provider would be required to ask the consumer
which method the consumer would prefer to receive information
regarding ongoing contract modifications.
This is not the most effective of my suggestions. Certainly, the
negotiation requirements discussed above have great potential of
posing significant burdens on both online service providers and
consumers. But adopted to some degree, negotiation requirements
could be key in eliminating much of the ignorance in the electronic
contracting process. To alleviate some concerns for the online
service providers, these negotiation options may not necessarily be
required of each online service provider, but rather could be one of
a few different ways an online service provider could ensure fair
notice. Thus, an online service provider could look at a range of
possible methods through which it could best avoid lack of assent
claims and choose the method that works best for the type of service
provided and the types of terms contained in the online service
provider’s wrap contract.
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D. Fostering Consumer Outrage
Public outrage seems to be the most likely effective means of
convincing online providers to revise their wrap contracts.
Unfortunately, only a few examples of public pressure have occurred
thus far, and the result of each was only a change in a single wrap,
without a market-wide impact. This subpart gives examples of
effective consumer campaigns and offers some suggestions for
fostering healthy consumer pushback.
Public backlash was instrumental in reversing a change to
Facebook’s privacy policy in January 2011.227 Facebook announced,
via its developer blog, a new feature that would provide application
developers with access to user phone numbers and addresses.228
Though this change was announced quietly at the end of the week,
negative public response inspired the company to suspend the
feature as of the following Monday.229 Although the change required
users to expressly grant permission for their information to be
shared, the surrounding confusion and frequent changes made to
Facebook’s privacy policy fueled public skepticism.230 Further, while
application developers are not allowed to share information gathered
from Facebook, such policies had been violated previously, as in
2010, when marketing company Rapleaf sold private information
gathered from Facebook to advertisers.231
This new Facebook feature was publicized on industry websites,
such as Gizmodo, where Max Read opined “Facebook should know
better than this,” and that such an announcement “shouldn’t be
dumped on the Facebook developer blog at 9 p.m. on a Friday.”232
The feature also troubled security experts like Graham Cluley, who
lamented Facebook’s past failures in privacy security, its popularity
as a target for data thieves, and ultimately suggested that users
227. See Facebook Pushes Privacy Boundary; Users Push Back, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jan. 18,
2011, 12:12 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/facebook-pushes-privacy-boundary-userspush-back-256191 (noting that, after receiving negative feedback forms, Facebook
removed the feature).
228. Laurie Segall, Facebook Halts Phone Number Sharing Feature, CNN M ONEY
(Jan.
18,
2011,
10:33
AM),
http://www.money.cnn.com/2011/01/18/
technology/facebook_privacy.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See David Goldman, Rapleaf Is Selling Your Identity, CNN MONEY (Oct. 21, 2010,
1:13 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/10/21/technology/rapleaf/index.htm.
232. Max Read, Third-Party Facebook Apps Could Have Access to Your Address and Phone
Number, GIZMODO (Jan. 17, 2011, 8:00 AM), http://gizmodo.com/5735382/thirdparty-facebook-apps-could-have-access-to-your-address-and-phone-number.
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should remove their addresses and phone numbers from the site.233
Finally, personal responses made by Facebook users through the
feedback forums were largely negative, and, in suspending the new
feature, the company attributed this decision to “useful feedback”
they had received.234
Facebook has frequently been at the center of privacy policy
controversies, some of which have been resolved through public
backlash.235 In 2012, Facebook subsidiary Instagram updated its
Terms of Service to allow private information to be shared with
Facebook, other third parties, and most notably, “a business or other
entity may pay us to display your username, likeness, [and] photos . . .
without any compensation to you.”236 The New York Times publicized
this change, stating, “[y]ou could star in an advertisement—without
your knowledge”; further, it claimed that this policy possibly violated
various state privacy laws.237 This publicity led to an immediate
response. National Geographic, a major Instagram user, threatened to
stop using the service unless the terms were “clarified,” and
numerous ordinary users threatened to quit the service.238 Instagram
reversed the policy, which had not yet been implemented, within days
of the initial New York Times article.239
The Facebook experience is fostered by wide participation and
users’ ability to use the site to disseminate information.240 The
likelihood of one or two users noticing a term in a wrap contract or
a change in terms is much more likely when drawing from a body of
more than a billion users each month and over 757 million active
Facebook users each day.241 Facebook also allows the posting of
233. Graham Cluley, Rogue Facebook Apps Can Now Access Your Home Address and
Mobile Phone Number, NAKED SEC. (Jan. 16, 2011), http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/
2011/01/16/rogue-facebook-apps-access-your-home-address-mobile-phone-number.
234. Facebook Pushes Privacy Boundary, supra note 227.
235. See supra notes 227–34 and accompanying text.
236. Jenna Wortham & Nick Bilton, What Instagram’s New Terms of Service Mean for
You, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2012, 5:02 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/17/
what-instagrams-new-terms-of-service-mean-for-you/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.
237. Id.
238. Brett Molina, Instagram Updating Policy After Photo Backlash, USA TODAY (Dec.
19, 2012, 8:11 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2012/12/18/instagramprivacy-policy-advertisers/1777005.
239. See id.
240. See Ami Sedghi, Facebook: 10 Years of Social Networking, in Numbers, GUARDIAN
(Feb. 4, 2014, 9:38 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/
feb/04/facebook-in-numbers-statistics (observing that 757 million users log on to
Facebook daily).
241. Id.
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user content, in which Facebook contract terms can be criticized.
Very few other online service and product providers are now subject
to such scrutiny.
A more recent example of consumer response to a much less
frequently used webpage involved the General Mills webpage wrap.
In 2013, consumers filed three cases against General Mills in
California, alleging that General Mills misled customers by using the
terms “Natural” and “100% Natural” on products containing
unnatural ingredients.242 Shortly after failing to have these cases
dismissed,243 General Mills took a step that appeared motivated by the
realization of the risk of further litigation. General Mills added a new
Terms of Service to its website’s browsewrap.244 Most notably, the new
Terms of Service included a forced arbitration clause which allowed
the company to demand secret, non-appealable arbitration overseen
by an arbitrator of the company’s choice.245 General Mills initially
provided no notification for the change.246 After the New York Times
contacted General Mills, it added a “thin, gray bar across the top of its
home page.”247 It stated, “Please note we also have new legal terms
which require all disputes related to the purchase or use of any General
Mills product or service to be resolved through binding arbitration.”248
In April 2014, the New York Times printed a story on the General
Mills change. The article reported that the policy precluded
consumers from suing in court as soon as “they download coupons,
‘join’ [General Mills] in online communities . . . , enter a companysponsored sweepstakes or contest or interact with [General Mills] in a
variety of other ways.”249 According to the New York Times, the policy
242. Bohac v. Gen. Mills, Inc., No. 12-cv-05280, 2014 WL 1266848, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 26, 2014); Janney v. Gen. Mills, Inc., No. 12-cv-03919, 2014 WL 1266299, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2014); Rojas v. Gen. Mills, Inc., No. 12-cv-05099, 2014 WL
1248017, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2014).
243. Bohac, 2014 WL 1266848, at *9; Janney, 2014 WL 1266299, at *8; Rojas, 2014
WL 1248017, at *8.
244. Stephanie Strom, When “Liking” a Brand Online Voids the Right to Sue, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 16, 2014, at B1; see also Mark Guarino, General Mills Drops Arbitration
Clause, but Such Contracts Are “Pervasive”, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 21, 2014),
http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/2014/0421/General-Mills-drops-arbitrationclause-but-such-contracts-are-pervasive.
245. See Burton LeBlanc, Victory for Consumer Rights: General Mills Drops Its Forced
Arbitration Clause, AM. ASS’N FOR JUST. (Apr. 20, 2014), https://www.justice.org/blog/
victory-consumer-rights-general-mills-drops-its-forced-arbitration-clause.
246. See Strom, supra note 244.
247. Id.
248. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
249. Id.
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terms suggested that simple consumer actions, such as “liking” the
company on Facebook would require consumers to be bound to the
legal terms, including the requirement to arbitrate, no matter the
nature of the dispute.250 The New York Times article also suggested
that the terms may apply when consumers purchased General Mills
products.251 While General Mills argued the terms “were widely
misread,”252 the intent is difficult to discern when the vagueness of
the terms leaves so much to judicial interpretation, particularly in
light of the notice that suggests the arbitration clause would apply to
a purchase or use of a product, without the need to browse the site.253
The New York Times article was picked up by numerous publication
services.254 The public responded with an onslaught of negative
consumer attention on social media websites such as Twitter and
Facebook.255 General Mills reversed the arbitration addition within
days and reinstated the prior policy.256 In the explanation on its
website, the company defended its now-rescinded legal terms as
having been mischaracterized and simply an attempt to “streamline[]
how complaints are handled,” further adding that “[m]any
companies do the same [thing].”257 General Mills specifically
identified the negative consumer response as the reason for reversing

250. See id.
251. See id.
252. See Kirstie Foster, We’ve Listened—and We’re Changing Our Legal Terms Back,
TASTE OF GEN. MILLS (Apr. 19, 2014), http://www.blog.generalmills.com/2014/04/
weve-listened-and-were-changing-our-legal-terms-back-to-what-they-were;
see
also
Strom, supra note 244.
253. See Strom, supra note 244.
254. The article was picked up by publications including Consumer Action,
Houston Chronicle, World News, and many others. See, e.g., Stephanie Strom, When
“Liking’ a Brand Online Voids the Right to Sue, CONSUMER ACTION (Apr. 17, 2014),
http://www.consumer-action.org/press/articles/when_liking_a_brand_online_voids_
the_right_to_sue; Stephanie Strom, When “Liking” a Brand Online Voids the Right to
Sue, HOUS. CHRON. (Apr. 16, 2014, 9:30 PM), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/
news/article/When-liking-a-brand-online-voids-the-right-to-5408669.php; Stephanie
Strom, When “Liking” a Brand Online Voids the Right to Sue, WORLD NEWS (Apr. 21,
2014), http://world-newstoday.com/when-liking-a-brand-online-voids-the-right-to-sue.
255. See Saya Weissman, What Brands Should Learn from General Mills’ Facebook
Fiasco, DIGIDAY (Apr. 22, 2014), http://digiday.com/brands/general-mills-legalpolicy-changes-really-mean.
256. See Foster, supra note 252.
257. Id.
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the change, even while arguing that the new policy was not intended
to treat consumers unfairly.258
Of course, if the New York Times picks up a customer complaint,
others who agree with the concerns will be motivated quickly. The
New York Times can characterize what is scary about the contract
terms or changes and the reach of consequences from doing simple
things seemingly unrelated to entering a contract. The New York
Times not only carries instant credibility, its writers know how to
turn a phrase. Some of the New York Times’ assertions about the
General Mills terms of service may have been an overstatement, but
the message was clear. Unfortunately, most wrap abuses do not get
coverage in the New York Times and this rare example cannot be a
basis for ignoring other reforms.
Notice to the user that terms exist is a start; notice about the
content of the terms is better; however, the kinds of notice that
academics propose will not translate into the necessary consumer
action. Disseminating sufficient information to raise consumers’
rightful ire generally will require the effort of experts to read,
identify, and explain what the wrap contract purports to do in simple
terms. These reports would need to be readily accessible.
One option would be a consumer news service or magazine that
provides online reports of customer conflicts involving wrap
contracts. Most prospective consumers of an online service will not
check there first, but some will. The site could encourage those who
share concerns to post information on their Facebook page or
circulate it elsewhere. Reports on wrap contracts could be organized
by categories of companies (food, clothing, Internet access) or in
alphabetical order and should be searchable. Particularly useful in
the short run would be a website that identified the top ten or twenty
worse offenders. Hopefully, this would have the salutary effect of not
only causing the targeted companies to reverse their policies, but also
informing other companies of the dangers of implementing such
wrap contracts. Of course, an information website will not be as
effective as Facebook or the New York Times, but it offers an avenue
for circulating information. Even more effective would be a
requirement that a website with a wrap provide the link to such a
service on its home page or next to an “I accept” button.

258. See id. (“Those terms—and our intentions—were widely misread, causing
concern among consumers. . . . [W]e felt [the terms] would be helpful. But
consumers didn’t like it. So we’ve reverted back to our prior terms.”).
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CONCLUSION
Wrap contract excesses have exceeded their usefulness. It is time
to reconsider their scope and enforceability under a variety of
situations, especially those involving consumers and routine, small
transactions. It is time for courts to take the ethical charge of
policing private contracting more seriously and for reinvigorating
doctrines such as unconscionability. It is time for economists to
confront the concept of market regulations and the ability of
consumers to shop around with more honest reality and less abstract
theory. It is time for large corporations and online service and
product providers to self-impose meaningful notice requirements in
standard adhesion contracts or cut back on their terms.
In theory, notice to consumers does facilitate the free market
concept that consumers are self-interested actors who will make
choices that force the market to better serve their interests or go out
of business. However, this economic theory assumes access to
information. Notice is a vehicle for providing consumers with
information, but notice is empty if it only leads to information that
cannot be read within reasonable time constraints, is
incomprehensible to almost all online consumers, is misjudged as to
enforceability, and cannot be negotiated, especially if it is part of a
product or service where the consumer has no viable alternatives.
Notice might be the best answer, but only if it is comprehensible
and time efficient.
Existing notice proposals will not take a meaningful bite out of
wrap contract abuses. If providing notice is the best free market
solution, the notice must be such that it conveys manageable
information that can be absorbed and compared to the offerings of
competitors with a reasonable amount of consumer time and effort.
This Article proposes a contents box that distills the relevant
information to a useable form. In addition, notice may not be the
answer in any form. Better solutions may be the establishment of a
best practices standard that allows consumers to quickly determine if
the wrap contract on a website conforms to a balanced standard form
or requires separate scrutiny. In addition, wraps should be subject to
some requirements of negotiability where the consumer has a
meaningful choice of options. The use of any of the proposals in this
Article will make a significant contribution to educating consumers
so they can unite and use their market pressure to insist on change.

